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Frustration of Contract in International
Trade Law and Comparative Law
Michael G. Rapsomanikis*
I. THE PROBLEM OF FRUSTRATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW
A. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Whether one's preference is directed toward the term "frustration,"
"impossibility," or "changed circumstances," the situation expressed by
all these words is basically the same; in all legal traditions it arises
"when unforeseen occurrences, subsequent to the date of the contract,
render performance either legally or physically impossible, or ex-
cessively difficult, impracticable or expensive, or destroy the known
utility which the stipulated performance had to either party."' The pro-
blem created in such a situation is, of course, whether deviation from
the stipulations of the contract should be allowed, by means of the con-
tract's adjustment, postponement or termination.2 This problem can be
better viewed as a conflict between the principle of private autonomy,
well expressed in the medieval maxim reservanda sunt pacta, and the
modern need of attributing a social function to private contracts,
thereby considering extra-contractual elements, such as good faith,
reasonableness and practicality.'
On the other hand, the problem of frustration is not new, having
known a considerable historic development. It became especially acute
by the turn of the century due to serious political disturbances (World
Wars), great economic upheavals (inflation, strikes, devaluations) and
an amazing increase in the number and the subject of internal and in-
ternational trade transactions. In order to fully understand the doc-
trine of frustration of contract, it is first necessary to examine the
historical development of the doctrine in the various legal systems.
*J.D., 1977, University of Athens; LL.M., 1979, Harvard University. Mr. Rapsomanikis
is presently a post-graduate student at Harvard Law School, and is an S.J.D. candidate at
the University of Athens.
1. Smit, Frustration of Contract A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 287, 287 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Smit].
2. l at 287-88.
3. See Hay, Zum Wegfall Der Geschdftsgrundlage im Anglo-Amerikanischen
Recht, 164 ARCHIv FOR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 231, 232 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Hay].
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B. CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS
1. Background Prior to the Nineteenth Century
Roman law, at least as jus strictum, did not recognize the problem
of frustration, always abiding by the express terms of the agreement
irrespective of how onerous for the debtor the contract could become.
Only absolute and objective impossibility was a valid reason for
discharge.' Yet, relief would be given sporadically through the develop-
ment of bona fide institutions like the exceptio dolis generalis and the
relevant provision of the Justinian Digest,' which can be traced as the
origin of the clausula rebus sic stantibus theory." Many centuries later,
under the influence of canon law, the post-glossators developed the
theory of difficultas,' which granted the debtor relief for excessive dif-
ficulty of performance.
The natural law jurists, in connection with their theory of the con-
tract as a means of voluntary transfer of resources from one party to
another, recognized three cases of discharge: physical impossibility,
legal impossibility and excessive onerousness of performance.' However,
the prevailing medieval theory, adopted in the major eighteenth century
codifications,9 is the aforementioned clausula rebus sic stantibus. The
content of this theory, effectuating a subsequent condition of
discharge, is that "contracts are made upon the tacit assumption that
an existing factual situation having an important bearing on the con-
tract will remain basically stable during the life of the contract."'"
Although the clausula proved very useful in the field of public interna-
tional law, in private law it was superseded and forgotten during the
nineteenth century.11
4. See R. LEE, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 349-50 (4th ed. 1956).
5. DIGEST 46.3.38.
6. This provision reads as follows:
When anyone stipulates that payment shall be made to him, or to Titius, the better
opinion is that it will only be properly made to Titius, when he remains in the same
condition in which he was when the stipulation was entered into ... for this agree-
ment, namely, "If he remains in the same condition," is understood to have been
tacitly included in the stipulation.
X S. SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW 193 (1932) (emphasis added).
7. See Mejers, La Force Obligatoire des Contracts et Ses Modifications Dans les
Droits Modernes, in ACTS DU CONGRES INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PRIVE 99, 101 (1950)
[hereinafter cited as Mejers].
8. A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 1040-43 (2d ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as VON MEHREN & GORDLEY].
9. See Mejers, supra note 7, at 103.
10. R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 506 (3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as SCHLES-
INGER].
11. See Hay, Frustration and Its Solution in German Law, 10 AM. J. COMP. L. 345-46
(1961) [hereinafter cited as Solution in German Law].
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2. Germany
In Germany, the nineteenth century distinction between declaration
of intention and motives, as well as the breakup of impossibility into
subjective and objective, or original and subsequent, led to the oblivion
of the natural law theories. The discharging effect of legal and physical
impossibility, however, remained unaffected." In 1852 the German
jurist Windscheid presented a new doctrine, the so-called Vorausset-
zung (presupposition) theory. According to Windscheid, each party's
contractual intention contains an "undeveloped condition" that the
legal effect of the contract will remain in force as long as a certain
situation exists; the situation being overthrown, the other party cannot
claim performance if it was possible to trace the existence of the condi-
tion from the circumstances of the contract.13 However, this theory did
not convince Windscheid's contemporaries.'
By the turn of the century various theories were advanced. Three
were the most eminent among them, upon which the Reichsgericht
repeatedly relied. First among them was the doctrine of Unzumut-
barkeit (nonimputability) under which the obligor can no longer be re-
quired to perform the original contract when such a claim imposes an
unreasonably heavy burden. 5 This theory seems to have absorbed
other notions like that of economic impossibility, financial ruin, and ex-
ploitation."6 Also advanced was the doctrine of Wegfall der Geschdfts-
grundlage (disappearance of the contractual basis) whose basis can be
defined as encompassing assumptions "concerning the existence, con-
tinued existence, or future occurrence of certain fundamental cir-
cumstances which, while not part of the contents of the contract ...
nor mere motive, have been made the basis of the transaction, either
by both contracting parties or by one alone with the other acquiescing
or not objecting."" This doctrine, mainly presented as a legal weapon
against the German inflation following World War I, proved useful in
other cases as well.' The third theory advanced was that of Treu und
Glauben (good faith), which more or less underlies all of the other Ger-
man doctrines and has been used most extensively by the
Reichsgericht. 9 Under sections 157 and 242 of the German Civil Code,
12. VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 8, at 1046-57.
13. 1& at 1045.
14. Id. at 1045-46.
15. Smit, supra note 1, at 297.
16. See Solution in German Law, supra note 11 at 359.
17. PALANDT, BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH KURZKOMMENTAR 187 (18th ed. 1959) (transla-
tion in Solution in Geman Law, supra note 11, at 362).
18. An example is the change in the value of foreign currencies. See Solution in Ger-
man Law, supra note 11, at 365.
19. See Smit, supra note 1, at 297.
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requiring a "good faith" interpretation and performance of private con-
tracts, the courts have in many cases supplemented contracts with
reasonable provisions embracing the problem of changed cir-
cumstances.0 Thus, German courts have proceeded to a "social" inter-
pretation of the contract, in contrast to the old theories which pur-
ported to interpret the contract "per se," without regard to extra-
contractual elements.2 The most noteworthy outcome of this trend is,
of course, the widely adopted practice among the German courts of ad-
justing the contractual obligations following frustration" in contrast to
the common law flat rule of ex nunc termination.
Other theories, forwarded not only in Germany but also in other
European countries, are the doctrines of mistake, unjust enrichment,
abuse of right, and Aequivalenz (equilibrium).23 The latter, understood
as a "contra bonos mores" disturbance of the proportion between per-
formance and counterperformance, seems to be gaining ground in cur-
rent German theory.
3. France
Although the French jurists, like their German counterparts, broke
with the natural law theories, they did not follow the same trends as
the Germans. Rather, they employed an all-sweeping notion of fault
with many extreme results, at the same time developing the typical
French law doctrine of force-majeure (irresistible force). 5
According to this doctrine, expressed in Articles 1147 and 1148 of
the French Civil Code, prerequisites for discharge are: (a) unforesee-
ability of a fortuitous event, (b) absolute impossibility of performance
and not mere onerousness, and (c) no fault on the obligor's part." These
requirements have been strictly enforced by the civil courts and in the
rare cases where relief has been granted, the contract has been
treated as a nullity,' contrary to the German practice of adjustment.
After World War I, there emerged in the French legal literature the
doctrine of imprgvision (lack of foresight), purporting to relieve the
parties, if the performance of their contract has subsequently become
very onerous, by means of interpreting their will and the bona fide Ar-
20. See Solution in German Law, supra note 11, at 356-58.
21. See notes 1-3 and accompanying text supra.
22. See Solution in German Law, supra note 11, at 363-64.
23. For a general discussion of these theories see Smit, supra note 1, at 288-99.
24. See VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 8. at 1098-99.
25. Id at 1047-48.
26. See David, Frustration of Contract in French Law, 28 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L.
11-12 (1946).
27. Id at 12.
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ticle 1134 of the French Civil Code.28 This theory was adopted and
repeatedly applied by the Conseil d'Etat in contracts between the
government and private parties in an effort to preserve the public
welfare.' Moreover, the Conseil d'Etat has been very flexible in its
decisions, allowing a modification of the contractual obligations.0 The
civil courts, on the other hand, have always rejected the doctrine of
impr4vision; due to their inflexible attitude, special legislation has
been employed in periods of great necessity."
4. The Jurisdictions of Adjustment-Italy and Greece
As mentioned above, the central European legal systems and the
French administrative courts have long recognized the modification of
the contract and the apportionment of the loss between the parties as
a means of relief in frustration cases. This practice was adopted by the
courts in these countries under the influence of legal theorists, basing
the result on the interpretation of general bona fide provisions of the
respective civil codes. In Italy and Greece, however, the legislators
have gone a step further, including special provisions to this effect in
the codes in addition to the general good faith clauses.
Thus, in Italy, in addition to the buona fede Articles 1366 and 1375
of the Italian Civil Code of 1942, express provisions allowing the ad-
justment or the dissolution of the contract were included in Articles
1467 through 1469. Article 1467, dealing with contracts for mutual
counterperformances, reads in part: "In contracts for continuous or
periodic performance or for deferred performance, if extraordinary and
unforeseeable events make the performance of one of the parties ex-
cessively onerous, the party who owes such performance can demand
dissolution of the contract . . . ." Article 1468, on the other hand, which
involves contracts with obligations of only one party, provides: "In the
case contemplated in the preceeding Article, if the contract is one in
which only one of the parties has assumed obligations, he can demand
a reduction in his performance or a modification of the manner of per-
formance, sufficient to restore it to an equitable basis."' 2 Thus, adjust-
ment of the contract seems possible only in the case of unilateral con-
tracts, whereas relief in the case of bilateral contracts is limited to
dissolution.
28. 1I
29. Id. at 13.
30. See VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 8, at 551.
31. See id at 1059-63.
32. See M. BELTRAMO, G. LONGO & J. MERRYMAN, THE ITALIAN CIVIL CODE 372-73
(1969). See generally Gambino, Eccessiva Onerositd Della Prestazione e Superamento
DelUAlea Nor-male Del Contratto, in 58 RIVISTA DEL DIRITTO COMMERCIALE 416 (1960).
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In contrast to the Italian statutory provisions, Article 388 of the
Greek Civil Code of 1940 reads:
If the circumstances in which the parties, having regard to the rules of
good faith and to business practice, decided to conclude a synallagmatic
contract, subsequently change, for extraordinary reasons which it was im-
possible to foresee, and if, as a result of this change, fulfilment of the
obligations, taking into account the counter-obligations, becomes inor-
dinately burdensome for the obligor, the latter may request the judge to
reduce the obligations at his discretion to a suitable extent,.or to rescind
the whole of the contract or the part not carried out.'
Thus, the Greek Civil Code seems to be more flexible, allowing three
forms of relief alternatively, including total dissolution, partial dissolu-
tion, or adjustment of bilateral contracts. In addition, the Code con-
tains general good faith provisions in Articles 200 and 288, which are
analogous to Articles 157 and 242 of the German Civil Code and Ar-
ticles 1366 and 1375 of the Italian Civil Code.
C. COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS
1. England
In England, the law of frustration has experienced an interesting
and dynamic evolution. Unlike Roman law, the starting point has been
the rule of absolute liability for performance, expressed in the seven-
teenth century decision of Paradine v. Jane." A first rupture of this
doctrine was brought about by the nineteenth century case of Taylor
v. Caldwell,5 which established the excuse for physical impossibility of
performance, as well as the "implied condition" theory." Two more
grounds of excuse were later added, including the debtor's inability to
carry out a personal services contract due to severe illness or death
and the legal impossibility of performance." These three exceptions
were understood to encompass contracts the achievement of which had
become absolutely impossible because of a supervening event. Yet,
even before the time Taylor v. Caldwell was decided, a separate move-
ment had started, later named frustration of contract, purporting to
33. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 511. See generally Zepos, Frustration of Con-
tract in Comparative Law and in the New Greek Civil Code of 1946, 11 MOD. L. REV. 36
(1948).
34. 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647). See Schmitthoff, Frustration of International Con-
tracts of Sale in English and Comparative Law, in SOME PROBLEMS OF NON-PERFORMANCE
AND FORCE-MAJEURE IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS OF SALE 127, 131 (Int'l Ass'n of Legal
Science, Helsinki, 1961) [hereinafter cited as Schmitthoff].
35. 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B. 1863).
36. See Hay, supra note 3, at 234.
37. Id. at 234-35.
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release the obligor for a mere excessive difficulty to perform." This
category included a number of charterparty cases as well as the
famous Coronation cases and, having in many instances overlapped
with the true impossibility cases, it was finally amalgamated with the
doctrine of impossibility. The case which combined the two trends,
F.A. Tamplin Steamship Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products
Co.,"' also introduced the "foundation of contract" theory,' analogous
to the previously examined German doctrine of the Geschdfts-
grundlage. Yet, the peak of the evolution was reached by the advance
of Lord Wright's theory in 1939, according to which the courts impose
on the parties what they think is "just and reasonable."" The doctrine
of frustration had thus expanded so much that, instead of interpreting
the contract itself, it sought to base the excuse on extracontractual
elements and considerations.'" Fearing that the principle of the sancti-
ty of contracts was at stake, the House of Lords unanimously reversed
a decision of the Court of Appeals' which had adopted Lord Wright's
formulation.
A new construction of the doctrine of frustration was attempted in
Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban District Council." In that
case, Lord Radcliffe enunciated the standard that "frustration occurs
whenever the law recognizes that without default of either party a
contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed
because the circumstances in which performance is called for would
render it a thing radically different from that which was undertaken
by the contract."' 5 This "radically different" test prevails in English
law today, although its theoretical basis remains obscure and its ap-
plication has been very strict, as the Suez Canal cases demonstrate."
Until 1943, there was only one form of judicial relief in frustration
cases. Declaration of frustration meant ex nunc termination of the con-
tract, with no down payments or reliance expenses being recoverable.' 7
38. Id. at 236.
39. [1916] 2 A.C. 397. See Hay, supra note 3, at 238.
40. Smit, supra note 1, at 304-05.
41. See Schmitthoff, supra note 34, at 134.
42. Hay, supra note 3, at 244.
43. British Movietonews Ltd. v. London and Dist. Cinemas Ltd., [1952] A.C. 166
(1951). See Schmitthoff, supra note 34, at 135-36.
44. [1956] A.C. 696. See Schlegel, Of Nuts, and Ships, and Sealing Wax, SueA and
Frustrating Things- The Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 23 RUTGERS L. REV.
419, 426-29 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Schlegel).
45. [1956] A.C. at 729.
46. See Hay, supra note 3, at 242-43; Schmitthoff, supra note 34, at 138-40. See also
notes 226-230 and accompanying text infra.
47. See Schmitthoff, supra note 34, at 14142 (characterizing this judicial practice as
"black and white jurisprudence").
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Down payments could be claimed under the rule of the decision in
Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd.,'8
and a more general settlement of the matter, including apportionment
of the reliance costs, was achieved by the Law Reform (Frustrated
Contracts) Act of 1943." Nevertheless, this statute, which will be ex-
amined more fully in relation to international trade law,50 did not
touch the substantive law of frustration.
2. United States
In the United States, frustration still remains a vague and unsettled
doctrine and the solutions advanced are not always consistent with the
theories involved. 1 American courts, in addition, are even more reluc-
tant to grant relief than the reluctant English courts." The rule of
Paradine v. Jane was transplanted from England in the nineteenth cen-
tury ' and was long sanctioned by the American courts, although ex-
ceptions with regard to certain important classes of contracts were
recognized.5 ' The breakdown of the absolute liability theory came
about by the end of the nineteenth century ' through the use of various
methods.
First, a differentiation between subjective and objective impossibili-
ty was made, with only the latter entitling the obligor to an excuse.
This distinction, adopted in the First Restatement of Contracts and
maintained in the tentative draft of the Second Restatement,5' has
been strongly criticized.57 Second, three cases of discharging im-
possibility, analogous to those of English law, were recognized:
supervening illegality; death or illness of the obligor in a personal ser-
vices contract; and disappearance of the essential person, thing or
other means of performance. 8 Although the coherence of this
systematization has been questioned,59 it was incorporated in both the
48. [1943] A.C. 32 (1942).
49. See Hay, supra note 3, at 252.
50. See notes 139-144 and accompanying text infra.
51. Smit, supra note 1, at 307-08.
52. See Hay, supra note 3, at 245-46.
53. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 45-47 (1974).
54. Id. at 77-80.
55. Id. at 80-81.
56. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 455 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 281, comment e (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1974).
57. See, e.g., Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal
Devices, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 335, 349-50 (1924) [hereinafter cited as The Apportionment of
Business Risks].
58. Patterson, Temporary Impossibility of Performance of Contract, 47 VA. L. REV.
798, 799 (1961).
59. See The Apportionment of Business Risks, supra note 57, at 350-52.
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Restatements." Third, the concept of "impracticability" defined as "ex-
treme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss,""1 emerged
as an excuse for nonperformance. The term was extensively used in
the Uniform Commercial Code 2 and it replaced the word "impossibil-
ity" in the tentative draft of the Second Restatement," yet neither the
text nor the comments of these major compilations offers an adequate
clarification of this general and uncertain concept.'
The variety of obscure, and to a large extent fictitious, theories
which accompanied these developments, 5 the objections of some
scholars to the liberalization of excuse," and the unfortunate connec-
tion of the whole matter with the notion of unforeseeability in the
courts"1 have contributed to the existing confusion and inability to
draw a sharp line between impossibility and frustration in American
law. The situation is not any better as to the form of judicial relief
awarded in the rare cases where frustration is acknowledged.
American courts adhere firmly to the "black and white" '" rule of ter-
mination of the contract, despite the condemnation of this practice by
American writers 9 and the legislative change in England, 0 from which
the principle was adopted. It is only to be hoped, consequently, that
the courts will reconsider their attitude in view of the comments to
the Second Restatement of Contracts71 and to the Uniform Commercial
60. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 458-461 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS §§ 282-284 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1974).
61. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 454 (1932).
62. See U.C.C. § 2-614(a), 2-615(a) & comment 3. See also notes 145-154 and accompa-
nying text supra.
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281 & comment d (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1974).
64. See VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 8, at 1101.
65. See generally Smit, supra note 1, at 308-10. The "implied term" theory was re-
jected in the Tentative Draft of the Second Restatement in favor of the "basic assump-
tion" test. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Reporter's Note to ch. 11 (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1974).
66. See Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices in
International Trade, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1429, 1437-39 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Ex-
cuse for Nonperformance].
67. See Note, The Fetish of Impossibility in the Law of Contracts, 53 COLUM. L. REV.
94, 98 n.23 (1953) [hereinafter cited as The Fetish of Impossibility].
68. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
69. See, e.g., Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
860, 883 (1968) (using the expression "Procrustean choice") [hereinafter cited as Farn-
sworth]; Hay, supra note 3, at 252-53.
70. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra. See also notes 139-144 and accompany-
ing text infra.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 292, comment b (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1974)
("In a proper case recovery may go beyond mere restitution and include elements of
reliance by the claimant even though they have not benefited the other party"). See VON
MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 8, at 1103.
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Code,"' proceeding to an adjustment of the contractual obligations of
the parties, as required by equity.
D. CONCLUSION
Having briefly presented the development and the present condition
of the way different legal regimes have faced the problem of frustra-
tion, it is now possible to compare the given solutions. First of all, it
seems that despite the differences, the following general
characteristics"' can be traced in all national jurisdictions: (a) occur-
rence of an event after the making of contract; (b) exceptionality and
unforeseeability of the event; (c) alteration of the contract in an in-
tolerable degree; and (d) no fault on the obligor's part. Nevertheless,
the existing antitheses, at least between the civil and the common law
regimes, should also be noted. Professor Hay has argued that these dif-
ferences are rooted in a dissimilar socio-political and jurisprudential
background: namely, that common law views the contract as an instru-
ment of liberalism and private autonomy, whereas civil law has ascribed
a social function to private agreements, which are thereby affected by
extra-contractual considerations." This fundamental difference finds its
expression in the unwillingness of the common law to recognize
frustration on the one hand and the rejection of adjustment as a
general form of relief on the other.
Still, the noticeable evolution of the question of frustration in
England and the United States should not be underestimated. It is well
enough to recall that common law started from a point opposite to that
of the civil law regimes' 6 - namely, from an unexcepted liability rule-
and it turned out to reach a contrary doctrine: impossibility or frustra-
tion is always an excuse, unless the obligor undertook the risk of the
contingency.7 With respect to the manner of relief, a considerable
liberalization has also taken place. 8 Could that mean that common law
is gradually being "civilianized?" Or, could the implication be that civil
law and common law regimes are proceeding through different
methods to the adoption of an identical frustration principle, such as
72. U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 6. See notes 153-154 and accompanying text infra.
73. See Mejers, supra note 7, at 111; Schmitthoff, supra note 34, at 128.
74. Hay, supra note 3, at 268.
75. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 10, at 512-14.
76. 18 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1931 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1978). See also The Appor-
tionment of Business Risks, supra note 57, at 352.
77. See Berman, Non-Performance and Force Majeure in International Trade Con-
tracts, in SOME PROBLEMS OF NON-PERFORMANCE AND FORCE MAJEURE IN INTERNATIONAL
CONTRACTS OF SALE 31, 33-34 (Int'l Ass'n of Legal Science, Helsinki, 1961) [hereinafter
cited as Non-Performance and Force-Majeure].
78. See text accompanying notes 47-50 & 68-72 supra.
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the "gap-filling" doctrine?"' Since the development continues, perhaps
these comparative questions cannot yet find an unquestionable and
conclusive answer.
II. THE PROBLEM OF FRUSTRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
A. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
If the problem of frustration is a central question of contract law in
general, special attention should be given to its appearance in a par-
ticular class of contracts because of the distinctive risks and burdens
parties in these contracts usually face. That class of contracts includes
international trade contracts, involving the sale or transportation of
goods beyond the national boundaries of a single country. The par-
ticularities of these contracts arise out of their two typical elements;'
namely, the transnational character and the long-distance nature of the
stipulated shipments. Specifically, with respect to the frustration issue,
there are special complications of international trade contracts. For ex-
ample, a change in the circumstances existing at the formation of the
contract and relied upon by the parties is more likely to occur and
more vital than in domestic transactions because of the stricter
governmental regulations, the frequent fluctuation of exchange rates,
and the greater risk of damage to the goods.8 Also, parties in interna-
tional trade contracts often do not know and do not trust each other;
this enhances the role of the contract in the transaction, as well as the
draftsman's burden to delineate each party's duties in case of a subse-
quent change in circumstances as clearly as possible." Finally, foreign
litigation for the resolution of the problem of frustration can be quite
troublesome with respect to the contracts in question." Application of
unknown laws, difficulty of proof, high costs, and distrust of the
foreign judge's impartiality are the major snags; while further com-
plications might arise out of the common international trade
phenomenon of "chain" of contracts, when the seller's foreign supplier
defaults and the seller assigns his rights against the supplier to his
buyer.
The examination of the problem of frustration and its confrontation
in international trade law is the second and major theme of this article.
79. See Smit, supra note 1, at 288, 295, 297, 301-02, 306, 314-15.
80. See H. Berman, The Law of International Trade 31-32 (1978) (unpublished
materials for the use of students at Harvard Law School; all quotations are made with the
author's permission) [hereinafter cited as Berman].
81. Id. at 33-34.
82. See Excuse for Nonperformance, aupra note 66, at 1419-20. See also notes 308-311
& 321 and accompanying text supra.
83. See Berman, supra note 80, at 417.
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This section of the article will survey the solutions proposed in theory,
statutory provisions, model contracts, individual contract practices,
and finally, the much discussed Suez Canal cases.
B. THE SCHOLARS
Only one writer has argued that the problem of frustration in inter-
national trade should be treated under separate rules, independent
from those of general contract law; the majority of scholars do not
make this distinction. Rather, they regard international trade con-
tracts as a subclass of all private agreements. Another group of
theorists purports to resolve the issue of frustration by means of non-
legal principles such as microeconomic analysis.
1. Professor Berman's "Enumerative" Test
Professor Berman has argued that the contractual practices in con-
tracts for the international sale of generic goods reveal that the par-
ties list specifically a certain number of discharging contingencies, in-
tending that all other risks will be borne by the obligor (seller or
shipowner)."4 Thus, the gap-filling principles of general contract law are
inapplicable in these contracts since no gaps are left by the open-eyed
and profit-seeking international merchants. 5 Moreover, according to
Professor Berman, the applicability of a liberal doctrine of excuse in
international trade contracts would impose a heavy burden of drafts-
manship on the parties," forcing them to list non-excusing events.
Also, under Berman's theory, a liberalization of discharge would in the
end become a loophole for the usually more powerful seller. 7 The ques-
tion of excuse, according to the same view, lies in the contract itself,
which reveals how the parties allocated the various risks between
themselves." Means of such a contractual interpretation should be the
price-delivery term, the general or specific force-majeure clauses, the
common understandings of the particular trade involved and other
relevant factors, such as the nature of the stipulated performance."
Professor Berman's opinion is desirable in that it draws attention to
the prevailing contractual practices in each trade, and to the nature of
the transaction. However, there are a number of difficulties with the
fundamentals of Professor Berman's theory. First, his methodological
84. Excuse for Nonperformance, supra note 66, at 1415.
85. 1d. at 1416.
86. Id. at 1417.
87. Id at 1437.
88. Id at 1423-24.
89. Id. at 1429-31, 1434-36.
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approach-namely, the solution of the problem of frustration in inter-
national trade through autonomous principles, to the exclusion of
general contract law rulesM°-is unacceptable. It is true that the legal
analyst should take into account the particular characteristics of inter-
national commercial transactions, as it occurs whenever a subclass of
similar contracts is involved (e.g., construction contracts or sale of com-
mercial paper). However, this consideration of differentiating points is
only a supplementary tool of interpretation and should not lead to an
overall disregard of general contract law principles, the purpose of
which is the formation of a framework encompassing all contracts.
Moreover, certain fundamental general principles, such as the rules of
offer and acceptance and the rules of the parties' capacity, cannot be
ignored. It is not clear how one could arbitrarily pass over some rules
and maintain others.
Second, Professor Berman's suggested solution is very strict, impos-
ing an excessive burden on the promisor, seller or shipowner. Even if
one assumes that "nothing is unforeseeable," as Professor Berman does,91
it does not necessarily follow that the parties "take it for granted that
the risk of events not specifically referred to shall be borne by the
obligor. 112 The parties might instead have intended termination of the
contract or application of general contract law or even nothing, fearing
that their agreement might fall through." Just because the seller is in
many instances the most powerful participant in the bargain, he should
not be made subject to such an absolute rule of liability.
Third, Professor Berman's argument about the draftsman's heavy
burden to list all the contingencies that will not excuse, can just as
well be inverted: the suggest approach would force the seller or
shipowner, who has the bargaining power to minimize his liability, into
listing specifically all the imaginable events that will excuse.
Moreover, the burden of expression is not easily assignable to either
party." Professor Berman's view seems more supportable with regard
to contingencies like export-import prohibitions's and insolvency."
90. Id. at 1416.
91. See Travaux du CoUoque de L'Association Internationale des Sciences Juridi-
ques, in SOME PROBLEMS OF NON-PERFORMANCE AND FORCE MAJEURE IN INTERNATIONAL CON-
TRACTS OF SALE 261 (Int'l Ass'n of Legal Science, Helsinki, 1961) [hereinafter cited as
Helsinki Discussions].
92. Excuse for Nonperformance, supra note 66, at 1416.
93. See text accompanying notes 236-237 & 310-311 infra.
94. See Farnsworth, supra note 69, at 884-85.
95. See Berman, Force Majeure and the Denial of an Export License under Soviet
Law: A Comment on Jordan Investments Ltd v. Soiuznefteksport, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1128, 1141-43 (1960).
96. See U.C.C. § 2-614(2).
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However, the repudiation of general contract law, the severeness of
the result, and the questionable basis of the theory do not allow for its
adoption as the general controlling rule.
2. The Helsinki Association
Different tests were suggested in the 1961 International Association
proceedings at Helsinki, in which problems of force-majeure and non-
performance of international sale contracts were discussed." Of the
opinions given at the Helsinki Conference, some of the most in-
teresting were expressed by the representatives of France and
England.""
Professor Andr6 Tunc disagreed with the enumerative test pro-
posed at the meeting, on the grounds that these force-majeure lists are
generally understood to be indicative and not exclusive. He also
posited that the impact of a listed contingency on the contract can
vary substantially. For example, a war might leave the contractual
purpose unaffected or, on the contrary, might destroy it completely."
In lieu of the enumerative method, Professor Tunc's view favors the
"diligent party" test, which focuses upon how assiduous the party
should have been in the circumstances it faced and whether the party
acted as required by diligence.1"
The enumerative standard was also discarded by Professor Schmitt-
hoff as an illustration of what he calls the "normative" test. This test,
he says, is old-fashioned, inflexible and has been abandoned by most
legal regimes in favor of the so-called "qualitative" test. 1' A uniform
international standard is needed, however, to facilitate the application
of the qualitative test in all national jurisdictions; such a standard, Pro-
fessor Schmitthoff suggests, is to be found in the English doctrine of
fundamental change in the obligation, which historically has been rare-
ly and reluctantly applied.' Schmitthoff argues that the extreme
liberalism of excuse, which is noticed in the individual contracts of the
parties, is compensated by the contractually stipulated effect of
frustration, the latter being usually a delay of performance and not a
termination of the contract. 3 Yet, according to Professor Schmitthoff,
the strictness of the national legal regimes on the one hand and the
97. See note 91 supra.
98. Professor Berman also participated in the Helsinki Conference, but his theories
are treated elsewhere in this article. See text accompanying notes 84-96 supra.
99. Helsinki Discussions, supra note 91, at 255-56.
100. Id& at 256.
101. Schmitthoff, supra note 34, at 146-47.
102. Helsinki Discussions, supra note 91, at 252.
103. Schmitthoff, supra note 34, at 150.
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liberalism of the contractual regimes on the other might be reconciled;
this could be done by means of employing a distinction between "major
frustrating events," which automatically terminate the contract, and
"minor frustrating events," which simply postpone the contractual per-
formance.'"
The standards suggested by these two professors reflect the legal
traditions of their own countries and it is therefore difficult to accept
them as international criteria. The test of the "radically different"
obligation, proposed by Professor. Schmitthoff, completely disregards
the reasonableness or diligence of the parties' conduct. On the other
hand, the "diligent party" test, recommended by Professor Tunc, ig-
nores the nature of the contingency, which might have destroyed the
contractual purpose despite the parties' perfectly reasonable behavior.
In other words, the former standard is too objective, the latter too
subjective. Moreover, the test of "fundamental difference" has long
troubled the English courts, who are still uncertain which theory
underlies the standard, and whether it refers to the obligation or to
the kind of performance." 5 Also, the endless calculations and com-
parisons which the application of this test requires have always been a
nuisance for the courts and have led to bizarre and controversial
results.10 It would appear, therefore, that both criteria are unsatisfac-
tory as such and that a possible combination of their re-
quirements-perhaps like Article 65 of UNCITRAL'1-would be
preferable. Nevertheless, Professor Schmitthoff's suggestions about
the adoption of "minor frustrating events," "secondary duties," and
"adjustment rights""' in all national legislations, should be welcomed
as very desirable developments of the law of frustration and as satisfy-
ing important commercial needs.
3. The "Better Loss-Bearer" Theory
Another solution has been proposed by John Henry Schlegel. Trac-
ing the historical origin of frustration and its distinct elements in com-
parison with impossibility and breach of contract, Schlegel concludes
that the essence of frustration is the undesirability-both socially and
104. Id at 157.
105. Port Line Ltd. v. Ben Line Steamers Ltd., (1958] 2 Q.B. 146, 162 (Judge Diplock)
("It would appear to be the fate of frustration cases when they reach the highest tribunals
that either there should be agreement as to the principle but differences as to its applica-
tion, or differences as to the principle but agreement as to its application") (quoted in
Schlegel, supra note 44, at 429 n.64).
106. For a discussion of the varying results in the Suez Canal cases, see Part II-F in-
fra.
107. See text accompanying note 161 infra.
108. Schmitthoff, supra note 34, at 157-58.
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economically-of enforcing some contracts after an extraordinary
situation has arisen.'" Although Schlegel feels that all the theories
about frustration-his own included-fail to provide the judge with a
practical standard with which to decide cases, he thinks that such a
guide can be found in the following formulation:
Where an unusual event occurs and frustration is alleged, contracts
should be enforced only when the contract in question is essentially
similar to the archetypical contract situation: the contract between
brokers, each essentially speculating on a narrowly fluctuating market ....
Thus, an event should be held frustrating when it is not one within that
narrow range of events normally incidental to the average broker's or
wholesaler's contract -slight delay and small market fluctuations."'
Schlegel suggests that when the contract deviates from the "arche-
typical" model, the loss should be split between the parties, whereas in
the opposite case, the loss should be placed upon the obligor."' Apply-
ing his proposed standard, Schlegel concludes that in an international
sales contract the buyer is the better loss-bearer, while in an interna-
tional charterparty the loss should generally be borne by the seller-
charterer."'
Schlegel's approach is very similar to an early suggestion that
"relevance should be attributed to such considerations as to who is in
the better position to bear the loss, what effect alternative allocations
of the loss will have upon the current of commerce and the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the conduct of the parties.""'
The argument is that the social policy underlying the principle of sanc-
tity of contracts can in many instances be subordinated to other social
policies and considerations, like fairness and promotion of business effi-
ciency. The weighing of these competing policies and the selection
among them in each particular case is left upon the "courageous"
judge." In commercial cases, particularly, this method suggests that
the best loss-bearer is the party who can subsequently spread the loss
among its customers."'
Professor Schlegel purports to resolve the problem of frustration
through the case-by-case identification of the "better loss-bearer." The
basic defect of this approach, as Schlegel himself recognizes, is its ar-
bitrariness; namely, the lack of any reliable standard for the deter-
mination of who should bear the loss. In addition, Schlegel's guide is, if
109. Schlegel, supra note 44, at 442, 447.
110. Id at 447.
111. Id.
112. I& at 437, 448.
113. The Fetish of Impossibility, supra note 67 at 99.
114. Id at 99-102.
115. Id. at 101-02.
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not "incomprehensible,""" at least uncertain and complicated. Schlegel
acknowledges frustration when a contract deviates from the "arche-
typical situation," and adds that the same result should be upheld
when an event varies his model. Yet, there are many instances where
the contract exists between peculating dealers (thus falling within the
"archetypical situation") but in which the event is entirely extraor-
dinary even for those profit-seeking middlemen. What should the
result be in such a case or in the converse case?
If just the formation of a contract between a manufacturer and con-
sumer gives rise to frustration, even when the contingency is not so
abnormal, the standard seems too liberal; if, on the other hand, a con-
tract between brokers can never be frustrated, irrespective of how ex-
ceptional the event is, the standard seems too strict. The other prob-
lem with the "better loss-bearer" theory, especially critical in the in-
ternational trade field, is its assumption and its justification: that the
buyer or charterer can subsequently spread the loss among his
customers. Merchants in international business, however, very rarely
enter into one transaction at a time; rather, they buy when they have
already agreed to sell, thereby forming a "chain" of simultaneous sale
and purchase contracts. 17 Therefore, in the usual case the theory of
the "better loss-bearer" is not helpful; the buyer or the charterer has
already entered into contracts of subsequent performance, being thus
unable to increase the agreed price in order to spread the loss. Only in
very rare cases would the theory seem realistic.
4. The "Casus Omissus" Theory
Another approach has been suggested by Professor Farnsworth, as
part of his attempt to solve the problem of gaps in the contract. Farns-
worth distinguishes between "absence of expectations," related to a
first process of selection in the parties' minds and "understatement of
expectations," pertaining to a second process of selection. If a certain
situation, such as a frustrating event, does not survive both these pro-
cesses, then it is a "casus omissus."' '18 When such a gap is established,
it should be filled by means of either using the actual expectations of
the parties (extracted from the negotiations or course of dealing), or by
appealing to basic principles of fairness and justice irrespective of the
parties' expectations (such as rules of thumb or socially desirable
116. See Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law:
An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL. STUD. 83, 87 & n.18 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Posner
& Rosenfield).
117. See Ian Stach Ltd. v. Baker Bosley Ltd., [1958] 2 Q.B. 130, 138.
118. Farnsworth, supra note 69, at 871-73.
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allocation of risk).11 Especially important for the issue of frustration is
Farnsworth's proposed solution in cases involving the qualification of a
duty which was expressed in absolute language. According to his
method, entitled "extension by analogy,"'' 1 the court is free to extend
the situation actually contemplated by the parties to cover other
similar situations. This approach, argues Farnsworth, gives the court
more leeway to adjust the parties' contractual obligations in cases of
frustration than might exist under other proposed theories.12 ,
Professor Farnsworth's approach embraces a much wider issue than
the problem of frustration: the mental processes by which people come
to contracting with each other and the reasoning steps that a court
employs, in order to reach its decision. Since that is the case and since
Farnsworth uses many complex abstractions and psychological
arguments, there is not much to be commented upon his theory here.
What can be noted with regard to the frustration issue is that Pro-
fessor Farnsworth reaches the right result at the following three
points: (a) that principles of fairness and justice are the ultimate
justification of discharge; (b) that it is time for common law to abandon
the absolute rule of termination of the contract, and to employ the
equitable measure of adjustment; and (c) that foreseeability of the
frustrating event is neither to be considered the decisive factor, nor to
be discarded as completely irrelevant, but is rather to be considered
together with the other circumstances of the case." Yet, whether the
intellectual process and standards suggested by Farnsworth can be
easily employed as a means of attaining a just result is a question
which each court must answer for itself.
5. The "Economic" Analysis of Frustration
Another version of the "better loss-bearer" theory is the recent at-
tempt to resolve the problem of frustration by means of economic prin-
ciples. This view purports to employ the "implicit economic logic of
common law,"" which, in contrast to the approaches of the various
legal scholars, has followed the standard of economic efficiency in
deciding cases. The argument is based upon a type of ex ante alloca-
tion of contractual risks made by the court if the contract contains no
119. Id at 877-79.
120. Id. at 881-82.
121. Id. at 883-84.
122. Id. at 885-87. Foreseeability is no longer generally regarded as a condition of
release. See note 67 supra. See also Schmitthoff, supra note 34, at 151-52; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Introductory Note to ch. 11 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1974).
123. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 116, at 84.
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relative provision.1"' According to this view, the standard which the
courts should apply in such a case requires the identification of "the
party that is the more efficient bearer of the particular risk in ques-
tion, in the particular circumstances of the transaction." '125 With the
reservation that the contingency be unavoidable through a reasonable
cost, the better loss-bearer is the "superior insurer;" namely, the party
that was in the better position to estimate both the extent of the loss
and the probability of the event and provide self- or market insurance
against it.'" This view rejects the notion of unforeseeability as decisive
of frustration cases," 7 concluding that unforeseeability fails to indicate
which party is the better loss-bearer.
A similar but more liberal approach has been proposed by another
supporter of risk allocation12 in terms of economic analysis. Under this
approach, it is argued that "since frustration remedies can in many
cases be applied or withheld with almost equal justification, they per-
mit the judge some freedom in allocating gain or loss between
contracting parties"'" and that the "normal approach that 'the loss,
whether great or small, must generally fall on one party or the other,'
is unduly simplistic. What appears to be injury when inquiry is nar-
rowly confined may be revealed as disguised gain to one or both par-
ties if viewed from a broader economic perspective."' 13 This view
basically purports to examine two of the typical Suez Canal cases,
namely the Gaon decision (sales contract) and the Sidermar decision
(charterparty), in light of microeconomic theory. The conclusion is that
both cases were in all likelihood wrongly decided, because the courts
cast the apparent loss on one of the parties only, whereas a broader
economic analysis reveals that there were other "disguised" losses,
which should have been apportioned between both parties.'
Since the proposers of the theory admit that it is still "incomplete"
and its purpose is "to guide not the decision of particular cases but the
formulation of rules to decide groups of similar cases,"", it seems that
this view cannot serve as a reliable standard in its present form and
124. Id at 98, 113.
125. Id at 90.
126. Id. at 91-92. See also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 74-79 (1973).
127. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 116, at 99-100.
128. For a more "legal" formulation of the risk-allocation theory, see The Apportion-
ment of Business Risks, supra note 57, at 336, 352 & 359.
129. Birmingham, A Second Look At The Suez Canal Cases: Excuse For Nonperfor-
mance Of Contractual Obligations In The Light Of Economic Theory, 20 HASTINGS L.J.
1393, 1397 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Birmingham).
130. Id. at 1400.
131. Id at 1405-06, 1412-15.
132. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 116, at 96, 118.
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that a thorough evaluation of its arguments should await its final
crystallization. It should be noted, however, that the premise of the
theory, that the purpose of contract law is the maximization of
economic efficiency, is very doubtful. Indeed, even assuming that the
parties' chosen allocation of contractual risks is the most efficient that
can be achieved -otherwise, a new allocation would at least make one
party better off without hurting the other'"-the most efficient alloca-
tion might have undesirable distributional effects."u Contract law can-
not aprove of any risk allocation that is beyond certain limits of justice
and which results from undesirable inequality of bargaining power.
The example of contracts declared unenforceable due to uncon-
scionability3 establishes that some risk allocations, though efficient in
the above sense, might be held by the courts to be unduly onerous.
Also, acceptance of the suggested formulation, especially in the in-
ternational trade field, would disturb well established business prac-
tices, expressed in clearly defined trade terms. For example, if the
buyer in a ci.f. contract were the "superior insurer" in a particular
case and was therefore required to buy insurance himself, this would
turn upside-down the content of the term "c.i.f.," as it has long been
understood and used by all international merchants.13 6 Moreover,
judges and lawyers are not economists and would certainly feel puzzled
facing the numerous assumptions and calculations that an "economic"
analysis of cases calls for; the uncertainty caused thereby would be
much greater than the problem purported to be solved. This is
especially true with regard to the latter version of this theory, which
is full of guesses and questionable estimates; surely, a case cannot be
decided like that without serious doubts about its reliability.
C. STATUTES
1. The English Statutes
The English Sale of Goods Act of 1893 covered only a small area of
the substantive law of frustration, providing that an agreement to sell
specific goods is avoided if the goods perish without any fault of the
parties before the risk has passed to the buyer."7 Thus, all the cases
133. Id. at 89.
134. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 633-35 (10th ed. 1976).
135. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 325-28 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited
as CALAMARI & PERILLO].
136. See, e.g., International Rules for the Interpretation of Trade Terms, International
Chamber of Commerce Brochure No. 166 (Incoterms 1953) ("Seller must . . . Procure, at
his own cost and in a transferable form, a policy of marine insurance against the risks of
the carriage involved in the contract") (emphasis added).
137. Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71,,§ 7.
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involving frustration of a contract to sell generic goods, and all the
other casualties to specific goods, other than perishing, remained unaf-
fected by the 1893 statute. 8 A limited treatment of these cases was
provided by the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act of 1943.1'
That statute excluded from its application only the above provision of
the Sales Act, thereby extending its scope to all instances of frustra-
tion not due to the vanishing of specific goods.4 0
The 1943 statute constituted a great innovation against the
previously absolute rule of terminating the contract in case of frustra-
tion. Not only did it provide for the recovery of any down payments or
other benefits exchanged between the parties before the time of
frustration, thereby affirming the Fibrosa decision,"' but it also allowed
the judge freedom to divide between the parties reliance expenses in-
curred in contemplation of the performance of the contract."2 Unfor-
tunately, the substantive rules of frustration were left intact by the
Law Reform Act, since it only dealt with the forms of judicial relief
after the recognition of frustration."" This defect, as well as the exclu-
sion of charterparties and insurance contracts from the application of
the Law Reform Act,"" lessens its significance in the field of commer-
cial international law.
2. The American Uniform Commercial Code
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is more oriented toward the
needs of international trade than any other internal legislation.45 Sec-
tion 2-613 of the UCC contains a provision similar to section 7 of the
English Sale of Goods Act, under the title "casualty to identified
goods." The basic frustration article, however, is section 2-615, entitled
"excuse by failure of presupposed conditions." It provides that a delay
in performance or nonperformance by the seller is excused under three
conditions: (a) a contingency must have occured, including governmen-
tal orders or regulations, (b) the non-occurence of the contingency must
138. See Schmitthoff, supra note 34, at 130.
139. Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 40, §§ 1-3.
140. See idL § 2(5)(c).
141. See note 48 and accompanying text supra. See also G. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS 605, 697-98 (4th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as TREIrEL].
142. See Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 40, §§ 1(2), (3).
143. See Hay, supra note 3, at 262.
144. See Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943, 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 40 §§ 2(5)(a),
(b). See also TREITEL, supra note 141, at 610. The Act, however, expressly grants the
same power of adjustment to arbitral tribunals. See 6 & 7 Geo. 6, c. 40 § 3(2).
145. See Honnold, The Influence of the Law of International Trade on the Develop-
ment and Character of English and American Commercial Law, in THE SOURCES OF THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 70, 83-87 (Int'l Ass'n of Legal Science, London, 1964).
1980
572 Duquesne Law Review Vol.18:551
have been a basic assumption of the contract, and (c) the contingency
must have rendered the seller's performance impracticable." '
The relation between section 2-613 and section 2-615 is not so clear
as in the case of the English statutes. For example, when an exclusive
source of supply has been agreed upon and the supplier fails to per-
form, without responsibility on the seller's part, only section 2-615 ap-
plies;1 7 the seller's discharge in that case is conditioned on his turning
over to the buyer his rights against the supplier. On the one hand,
although an increase in the cost of production or a rise or collapse of
the market do not normally excuse, they might become good discharge
grounds if they are due to unforeseen contingencies, which "alter the
essential nature of performance" or cause "a marked increase in cost
or altogether [prevent] the seller from securing supplies necessary to
his performance.""' 8 The effect of these liberal rules of excuse is
mitigated through the subjection of the provision to the obligor's
assumption of greater liability by agreement, which is to be found "not
only in the expressed terms of the contract but in the circumstances
surrounding the contracting, in trade usage and the like." 149
The UCC also provides for very interesting obligations on the ex-
cused seller's part; these include the tender of a commercially
reasonable substitute, if available;"' the duty to notify the buyer about
the delay or the non-delivery seasonably;"' and the obligation to
allocate the part of the production unaffected by the contingency
among all his customers in a fair and reasonable manner, with the op-
tion to include regular customers not under contract at that time."'
Finally, it is stated in comment 6 to section 2-615 that where the ab-
solute common law rule of "discharge or non-discharge" might produce
unjust or absurd results,
adjustment under the various provisions of this Article is necessary,
especially the sections of good faith, on insecurity and assurance and on
the reading of all provisions in the light of their purposes, and the general
policy of this Act to use equitable principles in furtherance of commercial
standards and good faith."'
Application of this principle by the courts might lead to results
analogous to those intended by the English Law Reform Act, despite
some pessimistic anticipations.'"
146. U.C.C. § 2-615(a).
147. Id. comment 5. But see id. comments 1 & 9.
148. Id. comment 4.
149. Id. comment 8. See Non-performance and Force Majeure, supra note 77, at 35-36.
150. U.C.C. §§ 2-614 & 2-615.
151. U.C.C. § 2-615(c).
152. Id. § 2-615(b) & comment 11.
153. Id. comment 6.
154. See Hay, supra note 3, at 265-66. More generally, Hay doubts whether the Code's
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3. The International Conventions
The Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS),
adopted in the 1964 Hague Conference and ratified by eight coun-
tries-exclusive of the United States'5-provides in Article 74:
[W]here one of the parties has not performed one of his obligations, he
shall not be liable for such non-performance if he can prove that it was
due to circumstances which, according to the intention of the parties at
the time of the conclusion of the contract, he was not bound to take into
account or to avoid or to overcome; in the absence of any expression of
the intention of the parties, regard shall be had to what reasonable per-
sons in the same situation would have intended."M
As extracted from the language of the provision, first preference is
given to the subjective standard of the parties' intention, in the
absence of which appeal is made to the objective standard of the
reasonable person's intention in similar circumstances. 57 The ULIS
was welcomed as "a successful compromise between Anglo-American
and Civil legal thought,""1 and as "an excellent definition of excuse for
non-performance," '159 although it did not include any duties of notifica-
tion or alternative performance, nor did it permit adjustment of the
contractual obligations.
Since it became obvious that the ULIS would not be universally ac-
cepted because of various inherent defects, the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade (UNCITRAL) undertook a revision", of
the ULIS provisions. In 1976 a working group presented a first draft
standards can seriously influence the common law of frustration. See id. at 266-67. Yet, it
cannot be denied that the Code brought about some developments. See text accompanying
notes 61-63 & 72 supra.
155. However, application of ULIS to international sales with a United States citizen
as a party is not impossible. See Berman & Kaufman, The Law of International Commer-
cial Transactions fLex Mercatoriaj, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 265 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ber-
man & Kaufman].
156. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, July 1,
1964, [19721 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 74 (5029) with Annex I, Uniform Law on the International
Sale of Goods, art. 74, para. 1 [hereinafter cited as ULIS], reprinted in 13 AM. J. COMP. L.
453 (1964).
157. See Helsinki Discussions, supra note 91, at 257 (Andr6 Tunc].
158. Id. at 251 (Clive Schmitthoff).
159. Berman, The Uniform Law on International Sale of Goods: A Contructive Cri-
tique, 30 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 354, 357 (1965) [hereinafter cited as A Constructive Cri-
tique].
160. See Berman & Kaufman, supra note 155, at 270. For a general review of the Com-
mission's work and perspectives on international trade law, see Honnold, The United Na-
tions Commission on International Trade Law: Mission and Methods, 27 AM. J. CoMP. L.
201 (1979); Rohwer, The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UN-
CITRAL), in Berman, supra note 80, at 556-63.
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Law of Sales which was revised in 1978, and is to be completed and ap-
proved by 1980. Article 65 of the 1978 UNCITRAL Draft deviates from
the ULIS formulation, providing that "[a] party is not liable for a
failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that the failure
was due to an impediment beyond his control.""1 '
It would appear that UNCITRAL achieves a better compromise be-
tween common and civil law traditions than ULIS, since UNCITRAL
permits consideration of the diligence shown by the obligor in the cir-
cumstances he faced. Moreover, the burden of proof that such diligence
was shown is shifted to the obligor, thus protecting the other contract-
ing party. Unfortunately, the question of diligence is connected with
that of foreseeability, since the same paragraph requires that the
party "could not reasonably have been expected to have taken the im-
pediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract.'
Moreover, comment 5 to the 1976 UNCITRAL Draft states that "all
potential impediments to the performance of a contract are foreseeable
to one degree or another" and that the foreseeability of the contingen-
cy can be extracted not only from the explicit contractual language,
but also "from the content of the contract." '
As previously noted, however, foreseeability should not be regarded
as the crucial factor in a frustration case.'" It is just an element to be
taken into account along with the other circumstances. To attach so
much importance to foreseeability, so as to make it conclusive of fault,
as UNCITRAL does, l6 5 is certainly a misconception-many foreseeable
contingencies are unavoidable even with utmost diligence. A mitigation
of this imperfection could perhaps be achieved through the position
taken by UNCITRAL that "in the final analysis this determination [of
foreseeability] can only be made by a court or arbitration tribunal on a
case-by-case basis.' 6
161. Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1978), art. 65,
para. 1, reprinted in 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 325 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1978 UNCITRAL
Draft]. The 1976 UNCITRAL Draft used the phrase "without fault" instead of "beyond
control," apparently to connote the same requirement of diligence. See 1976 UNCITRAL
Draft, art. 50, para. 1, reprinted in Berman, supra note 80, at 603. Compare the excuse
clause of E.C.E. Contracts 574 and 574A, which is quoted at text accompanying notes
174-175 infra. See also text accompanying note 183 infra.
162. 1978 UNCITRAL Draft, art. 65, para. 1, supra note 161, at 340. Compare the
analogous provision of the 1976 Draft, art. 50, para. 1, reprinted in Berman, supra note 80,
at 603.
163. Commentary on the Draft Convention on the International Sale of Goods, March
17, 1976, art. 50, para. 1, comment 5, reprinted in Berman, supra note 80, at 604
[hereinafter cited as Commentary on the 1976 UNCITRAL Draft].
164. See note 122 supra.
165. See Commentary on 1976 UNCITRAL Draft, art. 50, comment 4, supra note 163,
at 603.
166. 1I comment 6.
574 Voi.18:551
Frustration of Contract
Another interesting provision of the 1978 UNCITRAL Draft is that
of Article 65(2), stating that in the usual case of nonperformance by
the seller's supplier the seller can be excused only if the impediment is
beyond the control of both the seller and his supplier."8 7 Thus, the inno-
cent seller cannot escape liability by assigning to the buyer his rights
against his defaulting supplier, in contrast to section 2-615 of the
Uniform Commercial Code. This rule might seem strict, but it is
perhaps useful in view of the problem of foreign litigation.'"
Finally, the UNCITRAL excuse provision imposes upon the
discharged party the duties to notify the other party, as well as to
tender a commercially reasonable substitute."' 9 Unfortunately, the UN-
CITRAL drafters did not give the parties any right to claim adjust-
ment of their contractual obligations.
D. MODEL CONTRACTS
A study of the problem of frustration in international trade cannot
ignore relevant clauses contained in model or standard contracts,
drafted by individual firms, trade associations or international agen-
cies, with the purpose of removing the uncertainties caused by the
variety of dissimilar legal systems."' This section of the article deals
with the contracts drafted by the United Nations Economic Commis-
sion for Europe (E.C.E.)"7I for the optional use by international mer-
chants in their dealings; individual and trade association contracts will
be examined in the next section.
E.C.E. Contracts 188172 and 188A.. provide as follows:
The following shall be considered as cases of relief if they intervene after
the formulation of the contract and impede its performance: industrial
disputes and any other circumstances (e.g., fire, mobilization, requisition,
embargo, currency restrictions, insurrection, shortage of transport,
general shortage of materials and restrictions in the use of power) when
such other circumstances are beyond the control of parties.
167. 1978 UNCITRAL Draft, art 65, para. 2, supra note 161, at 340.
168. See text accompanying notes 83-84 supra. See also Excuse for Nonperformance,
supra note 66, at 1433.
169. 1978 UNCITRAL Draft, art. 65, para. 4, supra note 161, at 340; Commentary on
1976 UNCITRAL Draft, art. 50, para. 4, comments 7 & 12, supra note 163, at 604-05. For a
more detailed comparison between the excuse clauses of ULIS and UNCITRAL see
Nicholas, Force Majeure and Frustration, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 231 (1979).
170. See Berman, supra note 80, at 47-48.
171. Contract No. 188 is reprinted in id. at 66-71. The relief provisions of the other
E.C.E. contracts referred to in this article are reprinted in Helsinki Discussions, supra
note 91, at 235-36.
172. E.C.E. Contract No. 188, cl. 10.1 (General Conditions for the Supply of Plant and
Machinery for Export, 1953).
173. E.C.E Contract No. 188A, cl. 25.1 (General Conditions for the Supply and Erec-
tion of Plant and Machinery for Import and Export, 1957).
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The excuse provisions in E.C.E. Contracts 574174 and 547A' 7' read:
Any circumstances beyond the control of the parties intervening after the
formation of the contract and impeding its reasonable performance shall
be considered as cases of relief. For the purpose of this clause cir-
cumstances not due to the fault of the party invoking them shall be deemed
to be beyond the control of the parties.
E.C.E. Contracts 31216 and 410177 also contain identical excuse clauses,
providing:
Any circumstance beyond the control of the parties, which a diligent
party could not have avoided and the consequences of which he could not
have prevented, shall be considered a case of relief where it intervenes
after the formation of the contract and prevents its fulfillment whether
wholly or partially.
Finally, E.C.E. Contract 1A 178 includes the following exculpatory provi-
sion:
[W]here the fulfillment of the contract in whole or in part is rendered ab-
solutely and permanently impossible by exceptional circumstances beyond
the control of the parties and arising after the conclusion of the contract,
the contract or the unfulfilled part thereof shall be cancelled but neither
party shall be liable to pay damages.
A comparison of these clauses shows that only Contracts 188 and 188A
employ Professor Berman's preferable "listing method." However,
even in those clauses, the enumeration is not exclusive, as is recom-
mended by Professor Berman. 79 All the other E.C.E. contracts utilize a
qualitative standard. 8"
Also, even within the second category of contracts the tests used
vary from more to less lenient, including "impeding its reasonable per-
formance," "which a diligent party could not have avoizled," and "ab-
solutely and permanently impossible by exceptional circumstances.'.'.
Moreover, all the E.C.E. relief clauses include two common re-
174. E.C.E. Contract No. 574, cl. 10.1 (General Conditions for the Supply of Plant and
Machinery for Export, 1955).
175. E.C.E. Contract No. 574A, cl. 25.1 (General Conditions for the Supply and Erec-
tion of Plant and Machinery for Import and Export, 1955).
176. E.C.E. Contract No. 312, cl. 13.1 (General Conditions for the International Sale of
Citrus Fruit; General Conditions for the Export and Import of Solid Fuels).
177. E.C.E. Contract No. 410, cl. 18.1 (General Conditions for Export and Import of
Sawn Softwood).
178. E.C.E. Contract No. 1A, cl. 19 (Contract for the Sale of Cereals C.I.F. (Maritime)).
179. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
180. See Schmitthoff, supra note 34, at 148.
181. See Tune, Inex cution et Force Majeure Dans la Vente Internationale, in SOME
PROBLEMS OF NON-PERFORMANCE AND FORCE MAJEURE IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS OF SALE
179, 183-85 (Int'l Ass'n of Legal Science, Helsinki, 1961) [hereinafter cited as Tune].
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quirements: that the frustrating event must take place after the forma-
tion of the contract and that it be "beyond the control of the parties."
Attempts have been made to interpret the first requirement as imply-
ing that only events that are unforeseen at the making of the contract
can excuse under the E.C.E. provisions. 8" As already discussed, this
argument is not persuasive. Apart from the question of foreseeabilty,
however, the issue of excuse should not be made dependent on the
subsequent character of the event, for contingencies existing at the
formation of the contract .might simply be ignored by the parties. '83 As
to the second common prerequisite of the E.C.E. clauses, that the
event be "beyond the parties' control," the implication, expressly
stated in Contracts 574 and 574A, is that there must be no fault in-
volved. It should also be noted that all the E.C.E contracts impose on
the party claiming frustration a notification duty and that instead of
termination of the contract as the effect of frustration, the contracts
mandate a reasonable delay in the contractual peformance; only
thereafter can the contract be terminated.'"
One of the purposes of the E.C.E. contract drafters has been the
reduction of the difference in bargaining power between the parties,
by treating them on an equal basis.185 This trend is clearly reflected in
the frustration provisions just examined, which refer to "parties" in-
stead of "seller" or "buyer." On the other hand, the employment of
broader or narrower rules of excuse in different E.C.E. contracts can only
mean that these contracts reflect the different character and needs
of each particular trade." It is therefore questionable whether the
E.C.E. experts, who correctly decided to take into account the dif-
ferences of the various trades, should have attempted to obliterate the
distinctions in bargaining power within each particular trade."'
Equalization of the parties' bargaining positions cannot be achieved
through optional model contracts; it only makes them unrealistic and
deters contractors from adopting them in their dealings.
E. INDIVIDUAL CONTRACT PRACTICES
In addition to the model contracts discussed above, standard con-
tracts drafted by trade associations or individual firms are also rele-
vant to an examination of the doctrine of frustration in international
182. See Non-Performance and Force-Majeure, supra note 77, at 38.
183. See id. at 40.
184. See, e.g., clauses 10.2 and 10.3 of E.C.E. Contract No. 188 in Berman, supra note
80, at 66-71.
185. Berman, supra note 80, at 49.
186. See Helsinki Discussions, supra note 91, at 250 (P. Benjamin).
187. See also Berman, supra note 80, at 49.
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trade law. These contracts serve the same purpose as those drafted by
international agencies, like the E.C.E. contracts examined in the
previous section. The only difference is that they reflect the great or
small inequalities in bargaining power of the parties. For that reason,
individual standard contracts are more subject to alteration, based
upon changes in the parties' bargaining positions due to market and
regulatory conditions.'"
1. Contracts Protecting the Seller
The relatively short and nonelaborate Godfrey Cabot, Inc. contract
for the sale of carbon black and pine distillates contains the following
provision: "The filling of all orders is dependent upon strikes, ac-
cidents, fires, floods, inability to procure cars, war, insolvency of the
buyer, failure of any third party to supply us the above described mer-
chandise, or other causes beyond our control."1 "9 As one can easily see,
this clause safeguards the seller against all events beyond his control,
even against failure of his supplier, whereas the buyer is by no means
protected. Another provision of the contract gives the seller the option
to cancel any undelivered portion in case of governmental regulations
affecting the performance of the contract.' 9
Another standard contract which carefully shelters the seller's in-
terest is the Stein, Hall & Co. c.i.f. contract for the resale in the
United States of jute and other commodities bought in Asia. Clause 9
of that contract broadly subject's a seller's performance "to all con-
tingencies beyond the seller's control." Clause 10 makes the seller's
performance dependent upon all laws, regulations, orders and instruc-
tions of the United States or any foreign government. Finally, clause
11 excuses the seller for nonperformance by his manufacturer or sup-
plier.' 9'
The United States Steel International, Inc. c.i.f. and f.a.s. vessel con-
tracts provide yet another example of contracts drafted to the advan-
tage of the more powerful seller. Clause 7 of the c.i.f. contract, which is
identical to clause 3 of the f.a.s. vessel contract, gives the seller the
right to reasonably extend the time of his performance, if the latter is
delayed
due to fire, explosion, breakdown or accident, war or civil commotion,
strike or other difference with workmen, shortage of utility, facility,
188. Id. at 48-49. The contracts discussed in this section are reprinted in id. at 51-65,
72-86.
189. Id. at 51.
190. Id.
191. d. at 54. Clause 1 of this contract absolves the seller from any duty with respect
to export-import licenses. See id. at 53.
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material or labor, delay in transportation, compliance with or other action
taken to carry out the intent or purpose of any law or regulation of the
Government of the United States of America or any other Government,
or any cause beyond manufacturer's or Seller's reasonable control .... I"
An interesting element of the same clauses-under perhaps the model
of section 2-615(b) of the U.C.C."3-is the seller's right, under the same
circumstances, to apportion his products among his customers in the
manner which he thinks equitable. According to the different trade
terms of the contracts, export licenses are to be procured by the seller
and import permits by the buyer in the c.i.f. contract, whereas the
buyer has to obtain both of them in the f.a.s. vessel contract. However,
in both cases the buyer is made liable to pay for the materials in pro-
duction if the previously granted licenses or permits are invalidated or
revoked;19 this adds even more to the seller's bargaining leverage.
2. Contracts Protecting Both Parties
Slightly different from the above excuse provisions are those of the
Bethlehem Steel Export Corp. f.o.b. mill contract; although the seller
maintains his more powerful position vis-i-vis the buyer, one can find
some provisions in the latter's favor. Thus, the seller is excused, as in
the United States Steel contracts, for any delay due to listed con-
tingencies or other causes beyond his or his supplier's control and he is
given the same right to reasonably suspend his performance. Never-
theless,
the buyer may, subject to previously obtaining the consent of the seller,
cancel the purchase of such portion of the material for which details and
shipping instructions have been duly furnished in accordance with the con-
tract, as may have been subjected to such delay, provided such portion of
the material has not been manufactured nor is in the process of manufac-
ture .... I"
Also, although the seller's acceptance is made subject to the difficulty
in obtaining any required export licenses, these licenses are to be pro-
cured by the seller as the buyer's shipping agent; moreover, if the
previously granted licenses are invalidated, the stipulation is more le-
nient that in the United States Steel contracts since "the buyer shall,
at seller's option, be required to accept delivery."'"
A good example of a well-balanced contract, protecting both the
seller's and the buyer's interests, is the c.i.f. Contract for Hides,
192. Id. at 56, 61. An earlier standard contract of the same company protected it even
more. See id. at 87-88.
193. See text accompanying note 152 supra.
194. Terms of Payment, reprinted in Berman, supra note 80, at 55, 60.
195. Id. at 62 (clause 6).
196. Id. at 62, 63 (clauses 1-c, 12) (emphasis added).
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drafted by the International Counsil of Hide and Skin Seller's Associa-
tions, a trade association. Clause 12 of that contract, entitled "Force
Majeure," reads in part:
Should shipment within the stipulated period be prevented by Act of God,
strikes, lock-outs, labour disturbances, trade disputes, war, government
action, riots, civil commotions, fires, flood or epidemic, the time of ship-
ment shall be extended for six weeks after which this contract will be
void . . . unless a further extension is granted by mutual agreement."
Like the analogous clauses of the E.C.E. contracts, this provison
carefully avoids terms like "seller" or "buyer," employing instead
words such as "mutual agreement."'" Also, the clause follows the
"listing method," which is favored by most individual contract drafters
but not by the E.C.E. contract drafters.1" The enumeration seems to
be exclusive here, thus offering a basis for Professor Berman's
theory."0 ' Yet, it is noteworthy that the majority of individual standard
contracts-as well as the E.C.E. Contracts 188 and 188A-employ an
indicative list of contingencies, adding the phrase "and any other
causes beyond the Seller's control." Consequently, if an event other
than those listed occurs, it should not a priori encumber the seller, as
the above theory asserts, but it should be judged according to the ap-
plicable national law or international convention.
3. East-West Contracts
An examination of two Soviet standard contracts, a purchase con-
tract and a sales contract, reveals the "nationalistic" character of these
contracts; namely, that they are carefully drafted so as to protect the
Soviet parties' interests." Thus, the discharge clause of the purchase
contract" 1' contains a very narrow definition of force-majeure, listing
only fire, flood, and earthquake. The analogous provision of the sales
contract,"03 on the other hand, is much broader, and includes "such cir-
cumstances as fire, natural calamities, war, military operations of any
character, blockade, export or import prohibitions or other cir-
cumstances beyond the control of the parties."
Also, both contracts provide for an extension of the time of perfor-
mance, in case one of the listed events occurs, but this period is three
197. Id. at 65.
198. See also id ("If either party.) (clause 14).
199. See text accompanying notes 179-180 supra.
200. See text accompanying notes 84 & 179 supra.
201. See Berman, supra note 80, at 89.
202. Id. at 74 (Standard Purchase Contract Form of V/O "Technopromimport," clause
12).
203. Id. at 76 (Standard Sales Contract Form of VIO "Technopromimport," clause 9).
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months in the purchase contract and six months in the sales contract.
Moreover, if the purchase contract is cancelled by reason of force ma-
jeure, "the Sellers must immediately reimburse the Buyers for all the
amounts received from the latter . . . plus 40/0 per annum." The only
proper evidence of force-majeure events is, under both contracts, cer-
tificates issued by the Chamber of Commerce in each party's country;
this is, of course, in accordance with the planned character of the
Soviet economy.
The most manifest indication, however, of the drafters' effort to
secure Soviet contractors is found in the export-import license provi-
sions.' Despite the express character of the purchase contract being
f.o.b., the duty to procure the necessary export licenses and to incur
the expenses thereof is cast on the foreign seller. In addition, if the
seller cannot fulfill this duty, or if the granted export-license is re-
voked, not only is the Soviet buyer entitled to cancel the contract, but
the seller also has to pay liquidated damages. Under the sales contract,
on the other hand, all the export-import prohibitions or restrictions are
characterized as force-majeure, thereby excusing the Soviet seller,
whereas the procurement of import licenses remains a duty of the
foreign buyer. Thus, the protection of the Soviet parties is absolute in
both contracts.
Also relevant to an examination of individual standard contracts are
the relief provisions of two Chinese contracts, a purchase contract and
a sales contract. These are not as one-sided as the Soviet contracts,
perhaps reflecting the different character and needs of the Chinese
economy compared with the Soviet economy. A common characteristic
of both contracts is the generality of their excuse provisions. Thus,
clause 18 of the purchase contract " 5 reads in part: "Force Majeure: The
Sellers shall not be held responsible for the delay in shipment or non-
delivery of the goods due to Force Majeure . . . ." In this way, the
foreign seller is given ample protection but at the same time he is
obliged, under the same clause, to notify the Chinese buyer immedi-
ately and mail to him a certificate of the accident, with the Chinese
buyer being entitled to cancel the contract if the delay exceeds ten
weeks. Similarly, clause 3 of the sales contract' states: "In the event
of force majeure or any other contingencies beyond the Seller's con-
trol, the Sellers shall not be held responsible for late delivery or
204. Id at 74, 76 (Standard Purchase Contract Form of V/O "Technopromimport,"
clauses 9, 11; Standard Sales Contract Form of V/O "Technopromiport," clause 11(1)).
205. Id. at 85 (Machinery-Individual Purchase Contract, China National Machinery Im-
port & Export Corporation).
206. Id at 80 (Textiles-Sales Confirmation, China National Textiles Import & Export
Corporation).
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nondelivery of the goods." The broad language of this clause favors the
Chinese seller since no notification duty or cancellation right is
stipulated. In short, it can be said that the Chinese contracts purport
to facilitate trade with other countries without, however, making too
many concessions to the foreign contractors.
F. THE SUEZ CANAL CASES
Since the Suez Canal was opened for navigation in 1869,207 it has
become one of the most important commercial arteries, so as to be con-
sidered as "the usual and customary route" for all shipments from Mid-
dle East to European ports. Due to serious political disturbances in the
area, however, the Canal was twice closed in the past twenty-five
years, thereby causing substantial problems to commercial transporta-
tion, as well as acute legal disputes. On July 26, 1956 the Egyptian
government nationalized the French-managed Suez Canal Company.
During the subsequent hostilities with Israel, France, and Great Bri-
tain, the Egyptians blocked the Canal on November 2, 1956. In April
1957 the Canal was reopened, through the aid of a United Nations mis-
sion. Thereafter, the Egyptian government took over the collection of
navigation fees, compensating the shareholders of the Suez Company.
Ten years later, however, the "six day" war against Israel broke out
and President Nasser closed the Canal again on June 6, 1967. This
time, fewer problems and disputes were brought about, as is
demonstrated by the fact that only two cases were litigated in contrast
to the seven cases litigated in 1956. Finally, the Canal was reopened on
June 5, 1975, and since that time it has been owned and operated by
the Egyptian government. The Suez cases deal with international sales
contracts or charterparties entered into before the closings of the
Canal and allegedly frustrated thereafter.
1. Cases Involving C.I.F. Contracts
The first of the Suez Canal cases, Carapanayoti & Co. v. E.T. Green
Ltd., 8 involved a contract for the sale of Sudanese cottonseed cake to
be shipped from Port Sudan c.i.f. to Belfast during October or
November, 1956 at seller's option. The contract, which was entered into
on September 9, 1956, incorporated standard contract forms and provided
in clause 17: "In case of . . . blockade or hostilities .. .preventing
207. This short introduction is drawn from the facts of Soci6t6 Franco Tunisienne
d'Armement v. Sidermar S.P.A. (The Massalia), [19611 2 Q.B. 278, 282 (1960) and Palmco
Shipping, Inc. v. Continental Ore Corp. (The "Captain George K'1, [1970] 2 Lloyd's List
L.R. 21, 25 (1969). See also F. ELLIOT, A DICTIONARY OF POLITICS 443-44 (7th ed. 1975)
("Suez Canal").
208. [19591 1 Q.B. 131 (1958).
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fulfillment, this contract or any unfulfilled portion thereof so
prevented shall be cancelled."' After the closing of the Canal the
seller (and his supplier) refused to ship, claiming either frustration or
excuse under the above clause. In arbitration proceedings the umpire
and the Board of Appeals found for the buyer. On review before the
Queen's Bench Division, Justice McNair reversed the award and held
the contract frustrated. 10 The basis of this ruling was the "fundamen-
tal difference" test; although Justice McNair felt that the twenty-five
percent increase in freight needed for a voyage around the Cape was
not of itself substantial, the difference in distance (more than two and
one-half times) was enough to frustrate the contract. Moreover, the
availability of the Canal was a "fundamental assumption" of the par-
ties, who could by no means have foreseen the contingency."' Alter-
natively, Justice McNair implied that the contract could well be excused
by means of the hostilities clause.212
The decision does not seem unreasonable. First, disregarding the
question of frustration, clause 17 of the contract clearly discharged the
seller. Second, since the contract was concluded long before the start-
ing of any actual hostilities and the case is the first one in the history
of the Suez litigation, at least here the closure of the Canal was un-
foreseeable. Third, the test of "fundamental difference" of performance
that was applied in this case can also justify the result, since a
distance of 10,793 miles, as compared with an original distance of 4,068
miles,2"' is dissimilar enough to be considered within the contemplation
of the test. These considerations sufficed, in Justice McNair's opinion,
to compensate for the fact that the sellers had not attempted to ship
by the emergency route via the Cape, since such shipment would have
exposed them to the dangers of a much longer trip than they had
agreed to.
It has, of course, been argued that "a c.i.f. contract casts the risk of
nonshipment upon the seller even when shipment is rendered physical-
ly impossible . . .unless by an event covered by the excuse clause or
by some other clause in the contract."2 '" Such an assumption, however,
would impose a very heavy burden on c.i.f. sellers and would make
them hard pressed to anticipate all possible risks and list them in
endless contracts. A c.i.f. term might cast upon sellers-charterers the
risk of a normal freight increase; it cannot, however, lock them in the
prison of absolute liability, forcing them to bear tremendous freight
209. Id. at 132.
210. Id. at 148-49.
211. Id at 149.
212. Id.
213. See id at 142.
214. Excuse for Nonperformance, supra note 66, at 1422 n.21.
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fluctuations or other hazards that might be involved, such as
deterioriation of goods of guaranteed quality or quantity, or compensa-
tion to shipowners for the resulting delayed performance of other
already undertaken charterparties. The principles of general contract
law might properly discharge the seller when an event does not fall
within the relief provisions of the contract.
Although the Carapanayoti decision seems logical, it was-in a
weakly reasoned decision -overruled one year later by the Court of
Appeals, which tried two similar cases together. Both of these cases in-
volved c.i.f. sales of Sudanese groundnuts to be shipped to European
ports. In the first case, Tsakiroglou & Co. v. Noblee Throl G.m.b.H., 15
the contract had been made on October 4, 1956 for shipment to Ham-
burg during November/December. In the second case, Albert D. Gaon
& Co. v. Socigtg Interprofessionelle des Olagineux Fluides Alimen.
taires,216 two contracts had been made on October 12 and 31, 1956 for
shipment to Nice and Marseille respectively, during Oc-
tober/November. All the contracts incorporated standard forms and
contained the following excuse clause:
In case of . . . blockade or war . . . and in all cases of force majeure
preventing the shipment within the time fixed, or the delivery, the period
allowed for shipment or delivery shall be extended by not exceeding two
months. After that, if the case of force majeure be still operating, the con-
tract shall be cancelled. "
Following the closure of the Canal the sellers asked for an extension
under the above clause, but buyers refused and claimed a right to ar-
bitration. Trying the cases separately, both the umpire and the Appeal
Board found the sellers in default and awarded damages. The Queen's
Bench Division, which also tried the cases separately, felt bound by the
umpire's finding that the route via the Cape was not "commercially or
fundamentally different" and held the contracts not frustrated;"' nor
did the court think that the sellers were excused by the force-majeure
clause, because "there were hostilities but not war in Egypt at the
material time." 9 The Court of Appeals, which heard the cases
together, affirmed. The three appellate judges agreed that shipment
means "just placing the goods on board for the port of destination"M
and that since there was an alternative route when the customary one
215. [1960] 2 Q.B. 318 (1958), affd, [19601 2 Q.B. 348 (C.A.), affd, [1962] A.C. 93 (H.L.
1961).
216. [1960] 2 Q.B. 334 (1959), affd, [1960] 2 Q.B. 348 (C.A.).
217. [1960] 2 Q.B. at 326, 335.
218. Id. at 333, 346-47.
219. Id. at 333.
220. Id. at 359.
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was closed, the sellers were obliged to follow it. As Harman Lord
Justice said:
[N]either the date of arrival nor the physical circumstances of the voyage
can be supposed to be circumstances vitally affecting the practicability of
the adventure. Both these events affect the interest of the buyer and are
indifferent to the seller, who is not warranted in sheltering behind them
in order to save, what is alone affected, his pocket."'
The court also felt that the difference in the dates of making the con-
tracts was not so important as to distinguish the Carapanayoti case
from the cases before it; the former was, therefore, overruled.2
Finally, the House of Lords, to which the sellers in the Tsakiroglou
case appealed, also affirmed.' The Lords held that the question of
frustration should be determined with regard to the time of perfor-
mance, not of the formation of the contract, and applying either the
"fundamental or radical difference" or the "commercial nature and pur-
pose of the adventure" test, found no frustration."' The only party who
could object against the longer voyage, the Lords said, was the buyer,
who had no interest to do so in this case and did not. The Lords also
agreed that the excuse clause of the contract could not discharge the
sellers. Finally, approval was given to an earlier attempted distinction
between c.i.f. contracts and charterparties.m
The decision leaves a number of questions. Although the un-
foreseeability of the Canal closure is doubtful in the cases in question,
this could have been a ground for distinguishing Carapanayoti, where
unforeseeability seems established.' Furthermore, the rejection of the
force-majeure clause is objectionable: The distinction between
"hostilities" and "war" seems contrived in view, of the 1956 interna-
tional conflict in Suez; also, the contingency was clearly covered by the
word "blockade" in the provision. Moreover, the argument that ship-
ment means "just placing the goods on board" is rather formal and
literal. In addition to loading the goods and procuring the necessary
documents, a c.i.f. seller-charterer might be confronted with con-
siderable dangers, as was noted in the analysis of the Carapanayoti
221. Id. at 372.
222. Id. at 367.
223. [19621 A.C. 93 (1961).
224. Id at 115, 119, 122-23. The increase in distance and freight was 150% and 100%
respectively in Tsakirogloi4 see [19601 2 Q.B. at 327, and 350%/ and 200% respectively in
Gaon, see i& at 336.
225. [1962] A.C. at 116, 133-34. This distinction between c.i.f. contracts and charterpar-
ties was first recognized in Socidt6 Franco Tunisienne d'Armement v. Sidermar S.P.A.
(The Massalia), [1961] 2 Q.B. 278 (1960). For a discussion of the Sidermar decision, see
notes 237-247 and accompanying text infira.
226. See Schlegel, supra note 44, at 432.
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decision. In contrast to the reasoning in Carapanayoti, the Lords
thought that more weight should be attached to the non-shipment by
the emergency route than to any other conflicting consideration.
Nevertheless, as has been pointed out, the first true frustration cases
also involved a delay and a considerably increased cost of performance,
so that if the result in the cases in question were generalized, there
would be very few frustration cases.' If the changes in the perfor-
mance of these contracts really "fell far short of justifying a finding of
frustration," 8 as the Lords thought, the doctrine would be confined to
extremely rare instances of enormous alterations.' This is, in all prob-
ability, the purpose and the message of the decision- namely, that
very heavy limitations should be imposed on every frustration
finding.""0 Such an objective, however, is not easily accepted.
2. Cases Involving Charterparties
The first decision dealing with frustration of international charter-
parties was an American case, Glidden Co. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd.,
tried one year after the Gaon case. In Glidden, an American manufac-
turing company entered into four charterparties with a carrier for the
transportation of ilmenite from India to an American port. The first
charterparty was executed on September 7, 1956 and the other three
about November 1 of the same year; all of them included a force ma-
jeure clause excusing "restraint of princes and rulers" and also incor-
porated section 4 of the 1936 Carriage of Goods Act, excusing the car-
rier for losses resulting from "act of war" or other causes arising
without his fault."2 The charterparties also specified the route of the
trip as being "via Suez Canal or Cape of Good Hope, or Panama Canal,
at Owner's option ... to one safe U.S .... port at Charterer's option, to
be declared not later than on vessel's passing Gibraltar;" the last
phrase was typed later on the printed contracts.' The carrier refused
to perform after the closure of the Canal and the charterer brought
libel in admiralty. The trial court, relying on the Carapanayoti deci-
sion, held the charterparties frustrated. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, however, holding that the
227. Id at 433.
228. [1962] A.C. at 119.
229. See note 224 supra.
230. See Schlegel, supra note 44, at 434.
231. 275 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1960).
232. Id. at 255. Section 4(2) of the 1936 Carriage of Goods Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)
(1976), provides that neither the carrier nor the ship owner is liable for loss or damage
arising from certain circumstances beyond their control.
233. 275 F.2d at 255-56.
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carrier was obliged to perform by one of the alternate routes specified
in the contract.' In reaching that result, the court dismissed the route
provision as ambiguous and examined the negotiations between the
parties. It found that the carrier had unsuccessfully pressed for the in-
sertion of a specific clause, subjecting its performance to the availabil-
ity of the Canal, in accordance with its contract practice.2 3 From this
evidence the court concluded that the carrier did not expect to be ex-
cused without an express provision, having thus undertaken the
relative risk. Moreover, because there was an obligation to perform by
an alternate route, neither the force-majeure clause nor section 4 of
the Carriage of Goods Act was applicable.'
The result is acceptable but the court's reasoning is doubtful. The
fact that the carrier unsuccessfully tried to insert an express ex-
culpatory clause does not necessarily mean that the carrier assumed
the risk in question. The carrier might have attempted to insert the
clause to avoid future disputes and litigations about its excuse, which
it was always taking for granted; finding, however, strong opposition
by its new customer, the carrier did not insist, lest the agreement fall
through. This is, perhaps, the implication of the stipulation that the
ship should pass Gibraltar, which the charterer finally accepted. The
court reached the "fair and reasonable result" in this case, since the
carrier did not claim a remuneration for the performance of the longer
voyage, but decided not to perform at all; however, one should not
generalize from the court's rationale.
The first English charterparty case, Socigtg Franco Tunisienne
d'Armement v. Sidermar S.P.A. (The Massalia),' involved the carriage
of iron ore from India to Genoa, agreed upon October 18, 1956. Clause
2 of the voyage charterparty stated that the ship was to proceed to
Genoa "with all convenient speed," while clause 37 required the cap-
tain "to telegraph to 'Maritsider Genoa' on passing Suez Canal."' The
ship was loaded in India and sailed for Genoa on November 19, but one
day later the shipowner claimed frustration and a higher freight in
order to proceed via the Cape of Good Hope. The charterer refused
and the dispute was submitted to arbitration, while the vessel went on
around the Cape. The arbitrators held the contract not frustrated. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (Queen's Bench) reversed and awarded
the shipowner a reasonable remuneration in quantum meruit. Judge
234. Id at 257.
235. 1d Additional distance and freight involved in the longer voyage were not men-
tioned in the opinion.
236. Id.
237. [1961] 2 Q.B. 278 (1960).
238. Id at 281.
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Pearson felt that even though the parties anticipated the possibility
that the Canal might be closed-because of the late date of their
agreement-this did not necessarily prevent the frustration of their
contract, since it was only "one of the surrounding circumstances to be
taken into account in construing the contract, and [would], of course,
have greater or less weight according to the degree of probability or
improbability and all the facts of the case."' 9 The basis of the decision,
however, was the existence of clause 37 in the contract, which was in-
terpreted to mean that the shipowner was obliged to pass the Suez
Canal. ' Judge Pearson also ruled that the route via the Cape was a
highly circuitous and unnatural one, so as to satisfy the test of "fun-
damental difference" in performance." The previous Suez cases deal-
ing with c.i.f. contracts were distinguished as involving only an in-
crease in freight and the duration of the voyage, whereas charterparty
cases also involve additional hazards to the crew, the ship or the
goods. The Glidden decision was also distinguished as concerning a
particular charterparty with different terms.4 ' Finally, the court
denied that the shipowner was estopped from alleging frustration just
because it sailed for Genoa with knowledge of the blockade of the
Canal.4
The Sidermar decision has been the subject of controversy among
various commentators.2" Certainly, it was not an easy decision.
Although it can be said that the clause "Captain also to telegraph to
'Maritsider Genoa' on passing Suez Canal" clarifies the intention of the
parties as to the intended route, it could also be interpreted as mean-
ing "if passing Suez Canal."4 " The difficulty in Sidermar arose because
the parties did not specify the route in the contract, but instead in-
serted the ambiguous and vague provision "the ship . . . shall with all
convenient speed proceed to Genoa." Although the court tried in vain
to show any true difference between c.i.f. contracts and charterparties
as to the significance of a longer voyage,2"6 it certainly reached the
"fair and reasonable result." In contrast to the Glidden case, the
shipowner in Sidermar did not refuse to perform, thereby damaging
239. Id at 303.
240. Id at 303-04.
241. Id at 304, 307. The increase in distance was two-fold, and the shipowner was
granted forty-five percent additional freight.
242. Id at 307-08.
243. Id. at 310. As previously noted, the Canal was blockaded on November 2, 1956.
The ship in Sidermar sailed on November 19, 1956.
244. Compare Excuse for Nonperformance, supra note 66, at 1426-27 (disagrees with
the decision) with Schlegel, supra note 44, at 436-37 (agrees with the decision).
245. Excuse for Nonperformance, supra note 66, at 1427.
246. See notes 299-300 and accompanying text infra.
Vo1.18:551
Frustration of Contract
the charterer, but instead agreed to go around the Cape demanding on-
ly a reasonable remuneration. The case is a perfect example of the
tendency of the courts, when they deal with frustration issues, first to
reach what they consider the most just conclusion and then to try and
"rationalize" that result with legal rules and standards. 7
The rule of Sidermar did not survive long. Three years later, in
Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. v. V/O Sovfracht (The Eugenia),' 8 it was
overruled by the Court of Appeals. On September 9, 1956, the owner of
the vessel The Eugenia chartered her to a Soviet state organization
"for a trip out to India via Black Sea." '' A war clause of the contract
prohibited the vessel to enter dangerous zones without the
shipowner's permission.m The ship was delivered at Genoa, sailed to
Novorossisk and Odessa for loading and then proceeded to the Suez
Canal. The shipowner tried to prevent the vessel's entrance into the
Canal becuase of the warlike situation (October 30th), but in accor-
dance with the charterer's orders she did enter, being thereafter
blocked in the Canal for two and one-half months. The charterer claim-
ed frustration; the shipowner denied it, treated the contract as
repudiated, and after the vessel's release chartered her to one of the
shippers to complete the voyage (via the Cape). The questions with
which arbitrators and courts were faced in the case were two:
whether the charterparty had been breached by the charterer's con-
duct and whether it had been frustrated. The umpire answered the
first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative. The
trial court agreed as to the question of breach, holding that the
charterer could not rely on the "self induced" blockade of the vessel as
relevant to frustration.!1 The court looked upon the matter as if the
vessel had not entered the Canal, applied the "fundamental difference"
test and, relying on the Sidermar precedent, held the contract
frustrated. 2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, speaking through Lord Denning,
affirmed the trial judge's decision that the charterer had breached the
war clause by proceeding into the Canal without the owner's permis-
sion.m That determination, however, did not necessarily resolve the
controversial question of frustration. In attempting to decide :his lat-
247. See Schlegel, supra note 44, at 439. See also Thomas, Have the Judges Done Too
Much?, TIME, Jan. 22, 1979, at 92.
248. [1963] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 155, affd, [1964] 2 Q.B. 226 (C.A. 1963).
249. Id. at 169.
250. Id. at 170.
251. Id. at 172.
252. Id. at 173-76.
253. [1964] 2 Q.B. 226, 236-37 (C.A. 1963).
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ter issue, Lord Denning first discarded the "unforeseeability'; require-
ment, stating that "cases have occurred where the parties have fore-
seen the danger ahead, and yet made no provision for it in the con-
tract."' " What counts, Lord Denning concluded, is the existence or non-
existence of a contractual provision relative to frustration. Finding no
such provision in the charterparty, Lord Denning felt free to apply the
"radical difference" test. Considering the entire voyage from Genoa to
India, he found the additional thirty days needed for sailing via the
Cape to be insufficient to frustrate the charterparty."1 Thus, he re-
versed the lower court's decision and rejected the rule Judge Pearson
had enunciated in Sidermar." Finally, although Lord Denning felt that
a charterparty was different from a c.i.f. contract, he stated that
things would be complicated "if, in the case of a ship loaded with
cargo, the contract of affreightment was frustrated by the closure of
the canal and the contract of sale was not frustrated. 2
5 7
The Eugenia is further proof that when faced with the difficult
issue of frustration, courts first attempt to find the "just result" before
proceeding to the formulation of legal arguments. As Lord Denning
stated, "it must be positively unjust to hold the parties bound."'2
There is no factual similarity between Sidermar and The Eugenia that
would justify the overruling of the former by the latter, except that in
both cases the parties had not specified the vessel's route. However, in
Sidermar there was at least one ground supporting the court's holding,
namely the clause "Captain to telegraph ... on passing Suez Canal," an
analogue of which was absent in The Eugenia. Apart from that,
however, the great difference between the two cases is that in Sider-
mar the action was brought by a performing shipowner, asking for a
reasonable compensation, whereas in The Eugenia it was the charterer
who was trying to avoid his liability for breaching the war clause. The
trial court in The Eugenia thought that the provisions of the Law
Reform Act, combined with a late fixing of the date of frustration
(November 16th), would make up for any injustice.259 The Court of Ap-
peals correctly chose to hold the contract not frustrated, in order to
254. Id. at 239.
255. 1I at 240. There was a disagreement as to the computation of the additional
distance involved since the Queen's Bench Division computed the additional mileage from
Odessa to Vizagapatam, whereas the Court of Appeals computed the mileage from Genoa
to Madras. Data as to the increase needed in freight was not included in the reported
decisions.
256. Id. at 240-41.
257. Id at 241.
258. Id. at 239.
259. See [1963] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. at 177.
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allow the shipowners to collect the two and one-half months' hire.' By
doing so, however, the court caused two undesirable consequences.
First, it cast on the shipowner both the expenses of the thirty-day
longer voyage and the costs of maintainance during the two and one-
half month period, both of which might have been substantial. Second,
the court overruled the Sidermar decision, which represents the usual
case, without any special reason for doing so. As it has been pointed
out, the court could simply have held the charterer estopped from
alleging frustration,"1 leaving it to the shipowner to judge the advan-
tages and disadvantages of claiming frustration. Thus, in The Eugenia,
as in many of the frustration cases, the right result was reached, but
the wrong reasoning was applied.
The last decision involving contracts concluded before the first
closure of the Canal was an American case, Transatlantic Financing
Corp. v. United States."' On October 2, 1956, a shipowner entered into
a voyage charterparty with the American government for the carriage
of wheat from the United States to Iran. Although the route was not
specified in the contract, the vessel sailed on the Gibraltar-Suez
route.' After the blockage of the Canal, the shipowner sent the ship
around the Cape, and asked for a reasonable increase in the freight.
When the charterer refused, the shipowner filed suit claiming frustra-
tion. In affirming the dismissal of the action, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit enunciated a three-step
method of constructing a "condition of performance based on the
changed circumstances."' The first two steps of this method, involv-
ing the occurrence of a contingency and the non-allocation of its risk,
were easily found in the facts of Transatlantic. The court could not,
however, find the third requirement met: namely, the commercial im-
practicability of the performance."5 The court therefore concluded that
relief under quantum meruit should not be granted; the differences in
cost (one-seventh of the contract price) and in distance (one-third more
than the original) were not deemed sufficient to constitute "legal im-
possibility." ' The court also relied on Tsakiroglou and The Eugenia in
concluding that "where the time of the voyage is unimportant, a
charter party should be treated the same as a C.I.F. contract in deter-
mining impossibility of performance." '
260, Namely, the hire for the period the vessel had been blocked in the Canal. See
Schlegel, supra note 44, at 437-38.
261. Id at 438.
262. 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
263. Id. at 314.
264. Id. at 315.
265. Id at 316.
266. Id at 319-20.
267. Id. at 320 n.16.
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In the series of the Suez charterparty decisions, Transatlantic is
perhaps the only one in which the difference between the performance
rendered and that originally undertaken was not so great as to justify
frustration under the strict common law standards. Nevertheless, the
problem involved in the majority of these cases, that of performance
by a shipowner of additional services than those originally con-
templated, was present in Transatlantic as well. Since the contract was
insufficiently altered to become "a nullity," the court felt unable to
grant relief on a restitution basis. The court apparently felt that
Transatlantic was attempting first to take its profit on the contract,
and then to force the government to absorb the cost of the additional
voyage: "Apparently the contract price in this case was advantageous
enough to deter appellant from taking a stance on damages consistent
with its theory of liability."' Yet, it is not clear why the shipowner
should in equity lose its contractual profit or even incur part of its ad-
ditional costs, while the charterer keeps its own benefits. The
shipowner was not in breach; on the contrary, it had transferred
valuable services to the charterer. The Transatlantic decision
demonstrates the inadequacy of American law, which generally re-
quires impossibility of performance in order to grant relief for unjust
enrichment"' and, in contrast to the continental legal systems, does not
recognize adjustment of the parties' obligation.2T Partly for this
reason, and partly because of the reliance on The Eugenia (which in-
volved a different situation) and Tsakiroglou (where the seller had not
performed at all), the Transatlantic court failed to grant reasonable
relief." As for the remainder of the decision, the court correctly
recognized that "foreseeability or even recognition of a risk does not
necessarily prove its allocation,' ' 272 thereby agreeing with the English
courts as to the relevance of foreseeability to frustration issues.
3. Disputes Due To the Second Closing of the Canal
The two cases which arose after the second Canal closure on June 6,
268. Id. at 320.
269. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 292(1) & comment b (Tent. Draft No.
9, 1974). See also CALAMARI & PERILLO. supra note 135, at 508.
270. See notes 68-72 and accompanying text supra.
271. Another argument, adopted by the Transatlantic court in estimating the imprac-
ticability of the plaintiffs performance, was that the plaintiff was a better insurer against
the contingency than the defendant: "(1]t is more reasonable to expect owner-operators of
vessels to insure against the hazards of war." 363 F.2d at 319. Yet, this position, used by
the supporters of the economic analysis of frustration, see Posner & Rosenfield, supra
note 116, at 104, is not very convincing. Article 4(2)(e) of the Hague Rules, see Berman,
supra note 80, at 236, exempts the carrier for loss or damage arising from "acts of war."
See also text accompanying notes 132-136 supra.
272. 363 F.2d at 318.
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1967 (one English case and one American case) both involved charter-
parties. Both decisions adhered to the precedents established in con-
nection with the first Suez closure. The first case, Palmco Shipping,
Inc. v. Continental Ore Corp. (The "Captain George K'",2"I involved a
voyage charterparty which was entered into on April 10, 1967, for the
carriage of sulphur from East Mexico to West India. The contract con-
tained a clause requiring the master of the vessel to wire New York,
both before and after the passage of the Canal. ' After the ship had
crossed Gibraltar and was lying only three miles off Port Said, the
master was notified that the Canal had been closed to navigation. The
shipowner, claiming frustration and additional freight, sent the vessel
to India through the Cape. In arbitration proceedings, the umpire did
not decide the frustration issue, expressing puzzlement over how to
distinguish the "positively unjust" from the simply unjust and the
"radically different" from the simply different. 5 Relying upon The
Eugenia, however, the umpire found in favor of the charterer, although
he admitted that the voyage performed was "commercially not com-
parable" with that originally contemplated. 8
In the Queen's Bench Division, Justice Mocatta, after analyzing the
decisions in Tsakiroglou, Sidermar, and The Eugenia, concluded that
he should apply the "radically different" test. Attaching no special
weight to the fact that the Canal closure was unforeseeable in The
"Captain George K," he felt unable to distinguish The Eugenia on that
ground. On the other hand, the distinction between c.i.f. contracts and
charterparties, made in Sidermar and Tsakiroglou, was of no help to
the shipowner, because the contract was not on c.i.f. terms. Judge
Mocatta also thought that the clause "Master to give estimated dates
of arrival ... before ... and to again wireless ... New York ... after
passing Suez" was immaterial."
Thus, the only possible way to distinguish The Eugenia would have
been to rely on the difference in the mathematics of each case. Justice
Mocatta concluded that this difference (twenty-five percent additional
time in The Eugenia compared with fifty-seven percent in The "Cap-
tain George K") was not enough. 8 Therefore, the charterparty was
held not frustrated, although very unwillingly, with Justice Mocatta
273. [1970] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 21 (1969).
274. I& at 22-23.
275. Id. at 23.
276. Id. at 23, 26, 28.
277. Id. at 30.
278. Id. at 32. Analytically, the increase in distance in The "Captain George K" was
ninety percent, thus necessitating a voyage that was approximately fifty days longer. See
id. at 25. Data as to the freight difference was not reported.
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stating: "But for The Eugenia . . . I would have concluded that the
voyage performed was fundamentally different in kind from that clear-
ly contemplated by the charter . . . [and] I would have held the latter
frustrated and the owners entitled to succeed . . . . ..
The "Captain George K" may be considered an exception to the
general tendency of the courts to follow standards of fairness and
justice in deciding frustration cases. Certainly, a more courageous
judge would not have reached a result which in his opinion was not
reasonable, just for the purpose of following an easily distinguishable
precedent. Indeed, the dissimilarities between The "Captain George K"
and The Eugenia are not limited to only an "immaterial" difference in
figures. First of all, this difference is not at all immaterial. As was
similarly noted in relation to the Gaon case, if an increase of fifty-
seven percent in time and ninety percent in distance is considered in-
sufficient to produce frustration, the test of the "radically different"
performance becomes nothing more than a dead letter. Second, Justice
Mocatta stressed how much The "Captain George K" had deviated
from what later became the customary route, but he did not
distinguish The Eugenia on this ground, a case in which the ship could
easily have switched from the route via Suez to the route via the Cape.
Third, the provision requiring the master to telegraph to New York
before and after passing the canal was held immaterial, much like The
Eugenia held with regard to the analogous clause in Sidermar. This
telegraph provision, however, absent in The Eugenia, could have been
interpreted differently. Finally, the judge in The "Captain George K"
failed to see that The Eugenia purported to prevent the defaulting
charterer from escaping the liabilities caused by his breach. 80 In The
"Captain George K," however, the situation was different, because the
action was brought by the performing shipowner who was seeking
reasonable reimbursement for the additional costs of his performance.
The "Captain George K" is a good example of the power of precedents
at common law, and is a clear demonstration of the evils caused by the
unfortunate overruling of the Sidermar holding in The Eugenia.
The last in the series of the Suez frustration cases was an American
case, American Trading Production Corp. v. Shell International Marine
Ltd., 1 involving a voyage charterparty for the carriage of lube oil
279. I& at 32. The reason for the judge's reluctance was the clever remark of the
shipowner's counsel that in The "Captain George K," unlike The Eugenia, the vessel had
to sail an additional 6,000 miles before she could gain the new customary route via the
Cape. Justice Mocatta acknowledged that "the vessel here was therefore committed to
what became the wrong route," took this fact into account in estimating the ship's addi-
tional voyage, but hesitated to distinguish The Eugenia on this ground. Id.
280. See notes 258-260 and accompanying text supra.
281. 453 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1972).
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from Texas to India. The parties entered into the charterparty on
March 23, 1967, and included the following "Liberty clause":
In any situation whatsoever and wheresoever occuring and whether ex-
isting or anticipated before commencement of or during the voyage, which
in the judgment of the Owner or Master is likely to give rise to risk of
capture, seizure, detention, damage, delay or disadvantage to or loss of
the Vessel or any part of her cargo ... the Vessel may proceed or return,
directly or indirectly, to or stop at any such port or place whatsoever as
the master or the Owner may consider safe or advisable under the cir-
cumstances, and discharge the cargo, or any part thereof, at any such port
or place ... For any service rendered to the cargo as herein provided the
Owner shall be entitled to a reasonable extra compensation.2
The vessel sailed from Texas on the route via the Suez Canal and the
charterer paid the agreed freight; just before the ship had entered the
Mediterranean, the master was notified by the shipowner about the
various disturbances in Egypt. After the Canal closure, the shipowner
sent the vessel around the Cape, reserving its rights for extra compen-
sation, which the charterer refused to pay. The shipowner's claim
before the district court was dismissed and, on appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The court basically relied on
the Transatlantic case, which it found not distinguishable, although in
American Trading, the agreed tanker rate was based on a Suez
passage and the invoices contained a specific Suez Canal toll charge.
These facts, according to the court, showed an expectation of a voyage
through Suez, but not the fixing of a specific route.2"
Next, the court estimated the difference in performance caused by
the Canal closure (thirty days delay, eighty-five percent additional
distance, thirty-two percent additional expenses) and found it insuffi-
cient to frustrate the charterparty. Although recognizing that in
American Trading, the vessel had substantially deviated from the
route via the Cape, the court found no frustration, relying on the
analysis in The "Captain George K," as well as on the fact that the
disturbances preceding the closure were known to the master before
he had crossed Gibraltar.' Finally, the court denied the shipowner
compensation on the basis of the "Liberty clause," concluding that this
provision would be applicable only if the ship had not reached the port
of destination!"
The decision in American Trading further demonstrates that Sider-
mar represents the usual situation-a shipowner asks for proper com-
pensation-and of how unfortunate it was that the court in The
282. Id. at 943 n.6.
283. Id. at 941-42.
284. Id at 942-43.
285. Id. at 943-44.
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Eugenia failed to see a significant difference in the facts before it and
consequently overruled Sidermar. The holding in The Eugenia caused
a chain of unfortunate decisions: in both Transatlantic and The "Cap-
tain George K," the courts followed The Eugenia; in American
Trading, the court relied on Transatlantic and The "Captain George
K." The charterparty in American Trading could have been declared
frustrated on the ground of the vessel's commitment to the wrong
route. Moreover, the argument based upon the master's knowledge of
the trouble in the Canal is not very convincing. Why should he have
left the still customary route or even delayed the trip for an uncertain
period, in view of a mere possibility of the Canal closure? Never-
theless, even if the court in American Trading should not have been
expected to show more courage than Justice Mocatta in The "Captain
George K," relief could have been granted irrespective of frustration.
The "Liberty clause" of the contract gave the master or shipowner the
right to discharge the cargo at any port without notifying the
charterer, such discharge being complete delivery and entitling the
shipowner to an extra compensation. It is submitted that this provision
cannot be construed so literally as to deprive the owner of its right if
the ship reached her port of destination. According to the court's logic,
if the shipowner had ordered the master to stop at an intermediate
port and to discharge the cargo, or even to go back to a previous port,
the owner would still be entitled to a reasonable compensation for any
deviation; if, however, the owner had ordered the master to reach the
final port by another route- as it did-thereby minimizing all delays
to the charterer's benefit, then the owner should not be remunerated.
It is unlikely that this was the intention of the parties in including the
"Liberty clause" in their contract.
4. The Leavell & Co. Case-Final Remarks
In the context of a discussion of the Suez Canal cases, reference
should also be made to C.H. Leavell & Co. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 6 a
case tried before the Federal Maritime Commission involving the
legality of surcharges included in tariffs filed with the Commission.
Hellenic Lines, the carrier, undertook to transport construction
materials on behalf of Leavell & Co. (the charterer) from the United
States to the Red Sea by two separate consignments. The first ship
sailed from New York on May 27, 1967, following the route via the
Canal; at the time of the Canal's closing she was in Alexandria, and
was directed to proceed via the Cape. On the same day the second ship
sailed from New York for the Red Sea, directly on the Cape route.
286. 13 Dec. Fed. Mar. Comm'n 76 (1969).
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Hellenic added to the normal freight rates surcharges of sixty-five per
cent for the first trip and twenty-five percent for the second. On the
charterer's complaint, the examiner found the surcharges reasonable
and justifiable. On exception by the charterer, the Federal Maritime
Commission relied on two provisions of Hellenic's tariffs on file with
the Commission; the first of them entitled Hellenic to levy a surcharge
without notice, in case the expenses of Suez transit increased through
any cause, except for carrier's fault; the second clause was included in
Hellenic's bill of lading and read as follows:
Without limitation of any other provision herein, in any situation
whatever or wherever occurring and whether existing or anticipated
before commencement of, or during the voyage, which, in the judgment of
the carrier is likely to give rise to risk of capture, seizure, detention,
damage, delay or disadvantage to, or loss of the ship or any part of the
cargo or to make it unsafe, imprudent or unlawful for any reason to...
continue the voyage ... the carrier, whether or not proceeding toward or
attempting to enter the port of discharge, may proceed by any route or
return directly or indirectly to or stop at such other port or place
whatever as the carrier may consider safe or advisable under the cir-
cumstances, once or oftener, backwards or forwards in any order and
discharge the goods ... The carrier shall be entitled to a reasonable extra
compensation for any services in connection with the foregoing above the
agreed freight ....
On the basis of these provisions,' the Commission found that Hellenic
had the right to add surcharges on the normal freight rates,m pro-
ceeding then to the examination of the reasonableness of the added
surcharges.
Taking into account the examiner's findings that in the first trip
there was an increase of 193/0 in mileage and 1640/o in time, whereas
in the second the figures were 94% and 71% respectively, the Commis-
sion concluded that the surcharges were reasonable' and dismissed
287. Id. at 81. The American Trading court distinguished Leavel on the basis of this
second clause. That court relied on the slight difference between the excuse clauses in the
two cases-namely, that the clause in American Trading did not contain the words "by
any route" included in the provision in Leavel. Yet, the difference between "may proceed
by any route" (Leavell) and "may proceed ... to. .. any such port or place whatsoever"
(American Trading) is not so great as to justify this distinction. The two clauses are
almost identical and they probably reveal the same contractual intention of vesting the
shipowner with liberty to proceed by any appropriate route in the event of any emergency.
288. Hellenic relied on the "Baltic Stop Clause 1956," incorporated in its bill of lading
and entitling the carrier to change the route and increase the freight proportionally if
navigation were interrupted on the Canal after loading. 13 Dec. Fed. Mar. Comm'n at 81.
The Commission disregarded this provision since it was not on file with the Commission
and shippers could have no notice of it. Id. at 89-90.
289. Id. at 86.
290. Id. at 89-91.
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the complaint. As the Commission emphasized in its discussion,
"Hellenic rendered services, obviously at increased cost to itself ....
Hellenic did not merely return the goods to the port of loading as it
might have done under the bill of lading clause, but carried them on to
the port of destination . . ..
The Commission reached the right result. Of course, it did not have
jurisdiction to decide the issue of frustration -although the examiner
found that the passing of the Canal had become "impossible"" 2-and it
decided the case on the basis of specific clauses in the tariffs on file.
Nevertheless, it keenly noticed that the carrier had performed not only
what it had originally undertaken by the contract, but something more,
something beyond the scope of its initial obligation, for which it should
not be left uncompensated. This element is typical in the majority of
the Suez charterparty cases.
Sidermar, The "Captain George K," Transatlantic, American Trad-
ing, and LeaveUl, all presented the same basic problem: a shipowner
had performed additional services than those required under the con-
tract, thereby transferring benefit to the charterer, who nevertheless
refused to pay additional freight. Under these circumstances the
declaration of frustration would seem appropriate in order to enable
the shipowner to collect a reasonable remuneration on a quantum
meruit basis; unless, of course, there were overwhelming considera-
tions, such as contrary contractual stipulations, immaterial alterations
of performance or fault on the shipowner's part."3 Such a result is
justified not only by principles of restitution and unjust enrichment,
but also by fairness in commercial dealings, as well as by the need to
minimize risks of delay and damage to the cargo.
Indeed, the shipowner should not be deprived of his contractual pro-
fit to make up for his increased expenses, as was held in Transatlantic,
while the charterer keeps his own gains in full. Moreover, if the
shipowner had discharged the cargo at an intermediate port on the
basis of a "liberty clause," like those in Leavell and American Trading,
or if he had suspended performance relying on a clause "telegraph
after passing Suez," considerable delay and dangers to the cargo could
have been caused. In addition, even if the charterer had succeeded in
making a new charterparty immediately, he would still have had to
pay a higher freight for the employment of an emergency route, name-
291. Id. at 83.
292. Id. at 82.
293. The only case in which the changes in the circumstances of performance might
not justify frustration is Transatlantic. Yet, even in that case, were it not for the strict-
ness of American law, an adjustment of the parties' obligations would seem to be ap-
propriate. See notes 268-270 and accompanying text supra.
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ly via the Cape; why then should he be excused from paying the addi-
tional freight claimed by his original shipowner? Finally, the shipowner
should not be required to run the risk of defaulting from already
undertaken charterparties of subsequent performance"' without the in-
centive of a reasonable remuneration for his additional voyage. It has,
of course, been argued that the shipowner should bear the risk -of all
contingencies affecting his expenses, unless otherwise specifically
agreed;"5 however, as already discussed, such a strict rule is
undesirable.'
This factor was, in all likelihood, seriously taken into account by the
courts in Sidermar and Glidden; the different factual settings of these
cases justifies their opposite holdings. Sidermar stands for the above
described situation of additional performance, beneficial to the
charterer; holding the charterparty frustrated, the court enabled the
performing shipowner to collect extra freight. In Glidden, on the other
hand, the shipowner had not performed at all, nor did he intend to do
so; denying frustration, the court obliged the defaulting shipowner to
pay damages. Thus, the element of performance or nonperformance
seems to have substantially influenced the courts in their effort to
achieve a fair and reasonable result.m
In the later Eugenia decision, however, although it appears that the
House of Lords was also motivated by the purpose of reaching a just
solution, the doctrine of, frustration was improperly employed. The
Lords failed to detect that they were essentially trying an action for
breach of contract, in which the defaulting charterer counterclaimed
frustration in order to escape the liability resulting from its own
wrongful behavior. To prevent this undesirable result the court denied
frustration, but at the same time improperly overruled the Sidermar
294. This point was raised in Sidermar, although Justice Pearson did not attach much
importance to it. [19611 2 Q.B. at 305.
295. Excuse for Nonperformance, supra note 66, at 1426.
296. See text accompanying note 214 supra for the analogous statement made in the
case of a c.i.f. seller. See also note 299 infra.
297. This concept is well established in contract law:
A covert influence of the desire to reimburse detrimental reliance is not only
discernible in the "restitution" cases, where it is assumed that the party is excused
from the contract, but also in the determination of the issue of excuse itself. When
a court is faced with the question whether the circumstances of the case warrant
excusing the defendant from his contract, there is every reason to suppose that the
decision will be influenced by the type of relief demanded by the plaintiff, and par-
ticularly by the consideration whether the plaintiff... seeks essentially only to ob-
tain reimbursement (in the form of the promised price or otherwise) for expen-
ditures actually made in performing the contract.
Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 2), 46 YALE L.J. 373, 381
(1936) (emphasis added). See also TREITEL, supra note 141, at 706.
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decision, thereby causing a sequence of unfortunate decisions. The
prestige of precedent prevailed over the court's tendency to pursue
the just result, despite the shown hesitation. Yet, the House of Lords
could have achieved the same solution by other means,"' or it could
simply have distinguished Sidermar. The vice of the doctrine of
frustration is that it can be used in many dissimilar situations and that
is precisely what happened in The Eugenia.
The factor of performance or nonperformance by the party claiming
frustration most probably played a significant role in deciding the Suez
c.i.f. cases as well. Indeed, there is no great difference between
charterparties and c.i.f. contracts, as the courts in Sidermar and
Tsakiroglou purported to show. The manner of performance is, of
course, distinct between these two contracts, since the former con-
cerns transportation and the latter sale of goods; once, however, per-
formance has started, the c.i.f. seller might be faced with considerable
risks, as was noted earlier,' approaching those of a shipowner. Had
the seller in the Tsakiroglou case shipped the goods contracted for, the
House of Lords might have held the contract frustrated. Whether,
nevertheless, this reason was sufficient to outstrip other conflicting
elements present in Tsakiroglou2 " is to be doubted.
G. CONCLUSION
After the presentation of proposed theories, statutory provisions,
standard contracts, individual contract practices and landmark cases,
one can unhesitatingly conclude that a uniform standard, apt to resolve
the problem of frustration in international trade universally, can hard-
ly be found. The suggested scholarly tests are either too strict, too ob-
jective or too subjective, are sometimes vague, and it is often difficult
to comply with them. Also, the different needs and practices of each
298. See text accompanying note 261 supra.
299. See text accompanying note 214 supra. A shipowner's performance is relatively
prolonged and involves responsibilities such as maintenance expenses, crew payments,
crew fitness, and readiness of the ship to make subsequent voyages at an agreed date.
See Sidermar, [1961] 2 Q.B. at 305. Performance by a c.i.f. seller, on the other hand, is
simpler and mainly consists of loading the goods, procuring the necessary documents, and
sending them to the buyer. See Biddell Bros. v. E. Clemens Horst Co., [1911] 1 K.B. 214
(1910). Yet, after shipment, the seller-charterer might bear serious dangers, such as
deterioration of the goods under a clause "to arrive" or "guaranteed quantity or quality,"
liability against a foreign buyer to whom the first buyer assigns his rights, and remunera-
tion to the shipowner for default in the performance of subsequent charterparties. See
U.C.C. §§ 2-324 comment 4, 2-321(2), 2-615 comment 5. Thus, it would appear that the
nature, but not the gravity, of the risks involved differs in the performance of each con-
tract.
300. See text accompanying notes 226-230 supra.
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local trade cannot easily fall within them."' Standard and individual
contracts, furthermore, employ very dissimilar standards, reflecting
factors such as the kind of commodities involved and the superior or
inferior bargaining position of the parties. 2 Moreover, the courts of
each national jurisdiction show a preference for their domestic statutes
and contract principles, disregarding laws and theories advanced in
other countries. Thus, adjudicating international trade cases, courts
will abide by the "fundamental difference in performance" test in
England; by the "basic assumptions" or the "commercial impracticabili-
ty" doctrine in the United States; by the requirements of "good faith"
in Germany; or by the "force-majeure" standards in France. Of course,
the courts in almost every national regime take into account trade
customs, commercial understandings, or business practices, but these
can never supersede the applicable domestic law. 3 It would seem, in
this way, that a viable practical standard of frustration, satisfying the
purposes of universality and uniformity in international trade, does not
exist. '
Nonetheless, as the Suez Canal cases demonstrate, courts often use
the doctrines of frustration as a means of reaching what they consider
the fairest solution, unless their national frustration standards or fun-
damental principles (e.g., the stare decisis rule) do not so permit. In ad-
dition, several scholars, contractual clauses and statutory provisions
directly or indirectly refer to doctrines like "fairness" or
"reasonableness.1111 5 Thus, Lord Wright's finding that the achievement
of the "just and reasonable result" is the underlying principle of all
frustration tests would appear to have at least some basis.'
Even if one subscribes to the above theory, however, fairness and
justice alone cannot guarantee the parties in an international commer-
cial contract that any future disputes over discharge will in fact be
resolved in a just and fair manner, 7 absent an homogenous universal
301. A liberal doctrine of excuse, incompatible with that of Anglo-American law, can
be found in the practices of the Japanese trade. See Birmingham, supra note 129, at 1394;
Excuse for Nonperformance, supra note 66, at 1424 n.27.
302. See text accompanying notes 186 & 188 supra.
303. See note 312 and accompanying text infra.
304. See Helsinki Discussions, supra note 91, at 264 (Berman). Contra, id. at 252
(Schmitthoff).
305. See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 69, at 377-79; Tunc, supra note 181, at 184;
Fetish of Impossibility, supra note 67, at 100; U.C.C. §§ 2-614 to -615; ULIS, supra note
156, art. 74, para. 1; E.C.E. Contracts Nos. 574 & 574A, supra note 171, at 235; United
States Steel c.i.f. and f.a.s. vessel contracts, supra note 188, at 56 & 61; Bethlehem Steel
Export Corp. f.o.b. mill contract, supra note 188, at 62.
306. See Schlegel, supra note 44, at 444.
307. Id.
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standard. The best possible solution, therefore, seems to lie in the con-
tract itself. Indeed, the only unquestionable way in which the law of in-
ternational trade has managed to penetrate the various national
legislations is the clear expression of the parties' will in their interna-
tional commercial contract;" 8 the harsh questions of frustration should
above all be answered by the contractors themselves. So, the interna-
tional merchants should carefully and unambiguously indicate in their
contracts all the contingencies which they intend as excuse grounds for
either party. Any way of expression, enumerative or more general,", is
acceptable, provided that it clearly manifests the parties' will. Failure
to do so means that the parties will be subject to the vagaries and
unknown peculiarities of the applicable national law, in case a con-
troversy over excuse arises.310 Since the courts of any forum will apply
national law standards including the forum's conflict of laws rules, the
parties of a vague international commercial contract might find
themselves in the gears of the "implied term," or the "Geschifts-
grundlage," or the "legal impossibility," or any other of the numerous
and unreliable frustration doctrines.
Thus far, nobody disagrees. Both courts and legal scholars agree
that in the international trade field the parties create the law ap-
plicable to their relationships through their contract and that only
when nothing can be found therein should appeal be made to other
principles. This is, however, the heart of the problem for, despite their
efforts, draftsmen of international trade contracts do not often cover
the subject of frustration fully. This might happen, because they either
did not foresee a certain event (foreseeable or unforeseeable), or they
feared failure of their agreement, or they simply regarded the matter
as "going without saying," with no need for special reference."1 ' The
question then arises as to how the aforementioned danger of the par-
ties' subjection to the peculiarities of some unknown national legisla-
tion could be avoided. This is the target to which all the suggested
scholarly approaches aim.
The answer is, of course, not all simple. Everyone is free to choose
among the numerous existing theories or to add to those theories a
new one. Since, however, the courts in every national jurisdiction will
308. See Lagergren, The Limits of Party Autonomy, in THE SOURCES OF THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 201, 201-04 (Int'l Ass'n of Legal Science, London, 1964).
309. See Helsinki Discussions, supra note 91, at 237 (Heikki Jokela).
310. Thus, it would appear that the second part of Professor Berman's conclusion (that
"general doctrines of excuse for nonperformance should yield to express contractual provi-
sions for excuse and should not go beyond them," see Excuse for Nonperformance, supra
note 66, at 1420), is unsatisfactory.
311. See Farnsworth, supra note 69, at 871-73. See also The Eugenia, [1964] 2 Q.B. at
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not apply any other standard than that enacted or prevailing in the
forum, all these attempts are in vain as far as uniformity and univer-
sality are concerned. They would rather contribute to a further
breakup of the law of international trade than to its unification and
autonomous application as a distinct, transnational body of law.
Another method, perhaps less satisfactory than the contractual stipula-
tion approach, but necessary as its supplement, should be found.
In view of the above considerations, the only way to create a
uniform standard which will defeat the courts' insistence upon their
own national principles is the inclusion of a frustration provision in an
international treaty, carefully drafted so as to be ratified by most
countries. Only then will the courts yield to the adopted transnational
standard, and only then will the uniform customs and practices of the
international merchants "pierce" the national boundaries. One can
argue that the law merchant exists irrespective of any recognition by
domestic regimes, and in fact it is so, but in its present form this law
can hardly supersede the existing national laws; it can only be
employed-as it is done in practice-as a supplementary source. The
autonomy and supremacy of the lex mercatoria will not be honored by
the courts, especially with respect to frustration, unless this lex is
made respectable to them in the form of an international norm, official-
ly acknowledged by national legislation. 12
This would appear to be a reasonable method to apply when the
contractual stipulations do not suffice themselves to resolve a certain
dispute over frustration. Of course, the parties would be free to select
among other alternatives, devised to promote the unification of inter-
national commercial law, such as model contracts or trade terms."'
These methods, however, are not secure. 14 The best way to avoid the
312. These issues involve the difficult problem of the autonomy and enforcement of
the law of international trade. For a discussion of the many views on this subject, see Ber-
man & Kaufman, supra note 155, at 272-77 & 273 n.197. None of these views are in com-
plete agreement with the arguments advanced in the text. Professors Berman and Kauf-
man argue that the distinct and independent law merchant is "in fact enforced in national
courts and in arbitral tribunals," id at 273 n.197, although admitting that "national courts
have been reluctant to accept, in terms, the concept of a body of international commercial
customary law, "id. at 275. See also E. LANGEN, TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW 2-12,
20-22 (1970) (denies the autonomy and clearness of the international trade rules); C.
SCHMITTHOFF, UNIFICATION OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 6-8 (1964) (rejects the con-
tinuity of the ancient lex mercatoria and uniform custom as its primary source, in favor of
a new law merchant based on the similarities of the various national commercial laws);
Scott, The Risk Fixers, 91 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1978) (confines his theory about groups of
common interests to the field of banking law). See generally Berman & Kaufman, supra
note 155, at 273 n.197.
313. See Parts II-D and II-E supra.
314. For problems related to the adoption of trade terms see Trakman, Contractual
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whims of unfamiliar domestic legislations is the adoption of an interna-
tional norm which embodies universal mercantile practices, customs,
and understandings, thereby supplementing 1 ' the provisions of the
contract with certainty and uniformity. No one, of course, should
overlook the problems and the snags of unification through an interna-
tional convention. Because of the many compromises that have to be
made, the resulting rules are often inflexible and unsatisfactory.31 Yet,
so long as we believe that a separate and autonomous lex mercatoria
exists, we must also admit that its unification is to a great extent
possible. On the other hand, the recent efforts which were previously
examined in the context of frustration, as well as the general trend to
entrust tough problems to international conferences, must encourage
us to proceed."7
Such a transnational standard should, of course, primarily be based
upon the usages and customs of the international commercial commun-
ity, 8' but it should also achieve a successful reconciliation of the Anglo-
American and the Continental legal systems, so that it could be more
acceptable to both. 9 This transnational standard should aim at the
following points: (a) combination of both an objective and a subjective
standard and not an exclusive appeal, such as to a "fundamental dif-
ference of performance" or "the parties' diligence"; (b) avoidance of ex-
tremely strict or liberal tests; (c) practicability, comprehensibility, and
flexibility, so that the special circumstances of each case can also be
considered; (d) disregard of foreseeability as the decisive factor, but
consideration of it as an additional element; (e) recognition of the
courts' power to adjust the contractual obligation of the parties, a
Allocation of Risks in International Oil Sales 76-80 (1978) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation
in Harvard Law School Library).
315. The parties may, of course, select ab initio the international norm to be applied
to their relationships, regardless of their citizenship, see ULIS, supra note 156, art. 4, and
irrespective of whether the norm permits application by agreement, see 1978 UNCITRAL
Draft, arts. 1 & 4, supra note 161, at 326-27. In these cases, application of the interna-
tional rule is base upon the power of the contract itself. See text accompanying note 308
supra.
316. For a general discussion of the problem of unificaton of international trade law
see E6rsi, Measures for Unifying the Rules on Choice of Law, in UNIFICATION OF THE LAW
GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODs 293, 295-304 (Int'l Ass'n of Legal Science, Paris,
1966) [hereinafter cited as Edrsi].
317. See notes 155-169 and accompanying text supra. See also Honnold, The Uniform
Law for the International Sale of Goods: The Hague Convention of 1964, 30 L. & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 326, 351 (1965) ("the importance and difficulty of the problems justify the ex-
tra effort") [hereinafter cited as Honnold].
318. A Constructive Critique, supra note 159, at 368.
319. Another compromising effort should be made with respect to the differences be-
tween capitalist and socialist countries. See Ebrsi, supra note 316, at 297-98.
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noticeable defect of the common law systems; and (f) provision for the
so-called "secondary obligations" of the claimant,' namely, the duty of
notification and tender of a commercially reasonable substitute which,
although of minor significance, facilitate the resolution of disputes and
lead to more just results.
For present purposes, until the optimal standard is achieved and
adopted by the majority of the trading countries, the only possible sug-
gestion that can be made to draftsmen of international trade contracts,
so that the undesirable results of the application of an unfamiliar legal
system are eliminated, is to incorporate excuse clauses as clearly and
indisputably as possible. As an additional safeguard, in case a con-
troversy does arise, it would also be advisable that the draftsmen
specifically refer to a certain national law-directly or through listed
conflict of laws rules 21- which both parties know and agree to entrust,
for the interpretation or supplementation of their own force-majeure
provisions.
320. See Schmitthoff, supra note 34, at 157.
321. According to the best view, the private international law rules should supplement
the adopted international norm as well. See Nadelmann, The Uniform Law on the Inter-
national Sale of Goods: A Conflict of Laws Imbroglio, 74 YALE L.J. 449, 456-59 (1965); A
Constructive Critique, supra note 159, at 359-60. But see Honnold, supra note 317, at 334;
Tunc, The Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods: A Reply to Professor
Nadelmann, 74 YALE L.J. 1409, 1411-12 (1965). In this respect, Article 1(b) of the 1978 UN-
CITRAL Draft should be more successful than Article 2 of ULIS. See Berman & Kauf-
man, supra note 155, at 271. Unification of the conflict of laws rules is a distinct matter.
See Ebrsi, supra note 316, at 293; von Caemmerer, Measures for Unifying the Rules on
Choice of Law, in UNIFICATION OF THE LAW GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 313
(Int'l Ass'n of Legal Science, Paris, 1966).
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